The Empirical Research Of The Impact Of Corporate Governance On The Debt Maturity Structure Of Listing Corporations

In the process of corporate finance decisions, the question must be addressed is how to choose a reasonable debt maturity structure, the costs related to business decisions will be influenced by the relationship between the long-term debt and short-term debt, if debt maturity structure is unreasonable, it will increase the possibility of enterprise financial crisis. In recent years, although there are a small number of domestic scholars research in the debt maturity structure of listed companies centralizing on the corporate governance mechanism, the difference of researching methods and limitations of data selecting make conclusions quite different, and most of them are just on the one hand of the corporate governance. This thesis attempts to explore the impact of corporate governance to debt maturity structure of listed companies in a more comprehensive perspective.First, a detailed review of the debt maturity structure will be made, and there will be systematic analysis of the origins of corporate governance and debt maturity structure theory, then the hypotheses and a multiple regression model will be put forward on the basis of theoretical analysis, we will select full sample data of listed companies in China in2010, and we will make empirical analysis of debt maturity structure from the ownership structure, characteristics of board, the market for corporate control and overall effect of corporate governance.The results of the research show that the equity structure of listed companies, the Board characteristics and right of controlling corporate over the market is closely related to the debt maturity structure:The largest shareholder stake, the stake of the state-owned shares, dispersed ownership, board size, leadership structure are significantly negatively correlated to debt maturity structure; stake of corporate shares, the proportion of independent directors, the Board activities, the market of the company control have a significantly positive correlation to the debt maturity structure; managerial ownership and debt maturity structure type don’t have a significant relationship. The empirical results validate the theoretical assumptions presented in this thesis.As a result, this thesis put forward recommendations of policy:It is necessary to optimize the shareholding structure, to form a relatively dispersed shareholding structure, solving the problem of large shareholders control and to restrain and incentive managers effectively; Completing the system of board of directors and strengthening internal controls so that to prevent operational risks, optimize basic management improvement of the internal environment in corporate governance; and create a favorable external financing environment, which will bring a vigorously development of the corporate bond market, and broaden financing channels for enterprises.