Enterprise Investment Hold-Up Problem Of Specific Human Capital

More and more people has paid a great deal of attention to the role of human capital in the enterprise in the rapid development of knowledge-based economy in the process of modernization of the national economy.Investment in human capital has become an important strategic approach.Human capital has become a source of competitiveness of enterprises.Competition in the contemporary world is becoming more international.China’s industries and enterprises must vigorously to improve the training of human capital in order to shape and maintain our competitive advantage.Cultivation of specific human capital will become enterprise core competitive resources.Investment in human capital can not only enhance the development capacity, but also help the economic development of our country get out of the extensive development, playing a role in promoting the long-term development of China’s economy.Williamson proposed specific assets is based on the durability of the investment of specific transactions.After the termination of the transaction process, the investment transfer to other function will make economic inefficiencies, thus giving the investment losses.Specific assets lead to opportunistic behavior and a serious impediment to the enthusiasm of its investment, reduce its level of investment. Specific human capital investment and specific assets have the same characteristics.Enterprise serious lack of specific human capital investment which have a great impact on the competitiveness of enterprises.This paper pointed out that investment in specific human capital will be a shortage of investment based on the data model and game model.Mathematical model combined with reputation incentives analysis the government of investment in specific human capital in hold-up problem.Conclution is the reputation of incentives could encourage enterprises and employees to establish long-term mutually beneficial relationship,which is conducive to specific human capital investment and to give up the hold-up behavior for the long-term interests.Finally, we also mention several incentives to make up for reputation incentive status quo defects and improve the governance role in reputation incentives.This paper is divided into two parts, the introduction and main text. Introduction introduces the research and development of domestic and foreign investment in human capital and hold-up problem and reputation theory research status at home and abroad.The text contains three thematic chapters, first describe theory and characteristics of investment in human capital, hold-up problem and reputation of incentive.Secondly,there is a comprehensive description about the formation,the characteristics and the impact of hold-up problem.Finally, through analysis the active role of reputation motivation theory on specific human capital investment to illustrate goverment of hold-up problem.