The Research Of Relationship Of Managerial Power,Corporation Governance Efficiency And Senior Executive Compensation Of Listed Companies

Recently years, the problem of senior executive compensation of listed companies has becoming a discussing heated problem, one discussing point is that, is it reasonable of growing senior executive compensation of our listed companies and what factors to cause the growing senior executive compensation. According to principal-agent theory, the senior executive compensation incentive is a useful way to deal with the agency problem and reduce the agency cost in listed companies; however, managerial power theory thinks that the senior executive compensation incentive of public companies maybe can’t deal with the agency problem, it may even increasing the agency cost, and then becoming a part of agency problem. So that, form the discussing heated problem, this paper tries to analyze the problem of senior executive compensation bases on the principal-agent theory and the managerial power theory, just to analyze the effect of managerial power to senior executive compensation of listed enterprises and the effect of the senior executive compensation to corporation governance efficiency, and to measure corporation governance efficiency from corporation performance and agency cost. The research aim of this paper just to explore the relationship between managerial power and senior executive compensation, and the relationship between senior executive compensation and corporation governance efficiency, it can also be considered to explore the problem of influence factors of senior executive compensation and the problem of effectiveness of senior executive compensation.This paper including six parts, the first chapter is introduction, including research background, research ideas and methods, possible innovations. The second chapter is the summary of basic theories and literature review, including the definition of sever basic concepts and the summary of managerial power theory and principal agent theory, and then to systematically comb the domestic and foreign literature of the relationship between managerial power and senior executive compensation, and the relationship between corporation governance efficiency and senior executive compensation. The third chapter is theatrical analysis and research design, to put forward the research hypothesis bases on the theatrical analysis, and then to design the research. The fourth chapter is empirical research and analysis, using statistical software to make the descriptive analysis, the multiple regression analysis and the mean test analysis, to test the hypothesis and expand the reason. The fifth chapter is research conclusions, suggestions and measures, to make the last research conclusions, and put forward suggestions and measures bases on empirical analysis.This paper selects307listed companies’data form2007-2011as research sample in A-share market, including1535records. After nominative researching and empirical researching, this paper finds that the managerial power of listed enterprises is significant positive related with senior executive compensation; senior executive compensation is also significant positive related with corporation performance; and senior executive compensation is nearly positive related with agency cost; but for different registration area companies, higher senior executive compensation may not meaning better corporation performance, and even resulting in higher agency cost; in listed enterprises of our country, managerial power theory has more suitability than principal-agent theory. Therefore, this paper provides server pointed suggestions, including:to fully understand the problem of senior executive compensation and make scientific executive compensation system; to establish the regulatory mechanism of senior executive compensation, and to utilize the positive influence of it; to reasonably control the managerial power of listed companies and weak the negative influence of executive compensation to the enterprises; to establish and improve the internal and external mechanism of supervision and management; to improve the construction of external governance market; to delegate senior executives moderate power.The possible innovations of this paper including:this paper selects the new data form2007-2011, it nearly doesn’t find that related literatures use the data of this period of time until now; this paper to research the relationship between senior executive compensation and corporation performance, to measure the corporation performance form financial performance and share market performance, but now most literatures just to measure corporation performance from financial performance; this paper fully draws lessons form existing research literatures, to research the problem of influence factors of senior executive compensation and the problem of effectiveness of senior executive compensation of listed enterprises along a complete theoretical path of managerial power, senior executive compensation and corporation governance efficiency, it hopes that the result can provides possible value for designing and adjusting of senior executive compensation system of listed corporations, but this behavior doesn’t exist in existing literatures.