The Empirical Research On The Executives Compensation Incentives And Corporate Performance Of China’s Listed Companies

In the modern enterprise，the executives are responsible for a series of majorresponsibility about the strategic decision-making and implementation, playing a decisiverole on the development of enterprises.Because of the principal-agent relationship, there isinconsistent with the goals between the capital owners and executives. The focus of theproblem comes down to how to design a reasonable and effective compensation incentivemechanism that can improve the executives’ enthusiasm of creating corporate value wealthand making the enterprises develop the target towards the shareholders expected. Since2008the financial crisis originated from the USA subprime mortgage crisis make theexecutive compensation problems become the focus of theoretical research once again.According to a series of problems in China’s manufacturing listed companies, thisstudy focuses on discussing the relationship between the compensation and corporateperformance.It took manufacturing listed companies as objects in China on the basis ofrelated literature at home and abroad for reference research，using the descriptive statisticalanalysis and hypothesis testing analysis method to analysis important factors of executivecompensation in our country at present stage. For improvement of the problems existing inour country enterprise salary incentive, the study is the purpose of providing our countryenterprise with the necessary theoretical support to design executive compensationincentive. It also provide a reference basis about how to improve the company performanceand the future of carrying out government policy formulation and adjustment.The empirical research results indicated that:(1)Executives compensation has a strongpositive correlation relationship with corporate performance.And also found that it is notonly related to current corporate performance, but is linked with the results of the previousperiod;corporate performance has a negative correlation relationship with executivesshareholding ratio;(2)Executive compensation has a negative correlation relationship withexecutives shareholding ratio, the proportions of the independent directors, the tenure ofexecutives and the proportions of state-owned shares,but has a positive correlationrelationship with corporate’s size, public area,executives’age and level of education.