Influence Of Internal Control Information Disclosure On Listing Corporation Investment Efficiency

This paper tries to learn from the quality of information research, and studymechanism of internal control information disclosure quality governing inefficiencyinvestment of the enterprises within the framework of the double principal-agentconflict. Based on the research in the above, the paper also tests the relation betweeninternal control information disclosure quality and inefficiency investment of theenterprise. First, this paper using Richardson (2006) model to measure the listingcorporations’ investment efficiency on a sample of listed corporations ofmanufacturing industry in China from2010to2011, and then in the doubleprincipal-agent perspective, by establishing regression model, by descriptive statistics,correlation and regression analysis, empirical testing the influence of doubleprincipal-agent conflict on behavior of enterprise inefficient investment.Study found that, when the enterprise has the double principal-agent conflict,insufficient investment and excessive investment of these two kinds of inefficientinvestment behavior in the state-owned enterprise is more serious; the presence ofdouble principal agent, enterprise asset turnover rate is lower, the agency problem ismore serious, and enterprise inefficiency investment behavior is also more and moreserious. The study also found that, both of the first class agency conflicts and secondclass agency conflict will cause overinvestment in the enterprises, but theunderinvestment in the enterprises are mainly caused by the first class agent conflict,second class agency conflict plays a governance role on the enterprisesunderinvestment. While the overall internal control information disclosure quality ofour country manufacturing industry listing companies is not high, but the evidencefound in the double principal agent, High quality of internal control informationdisclosure can still reduce the overinvestment of company; High quality of internalcontrol information disclosure also can reduce the underinvestment of company. Andhigh quality internal control information disclosure of listing company governance theinadequate investment’s effect is more obvious. Enhance internal control informationdisclosure quality, can improve the internal control information supervision and evaluation of effect and signal transmission function, decreased the adverse selectionand moral hazard which arising from the information asymmetry, thus to enhancethe enterprises investment efficiency. Through further research found that,through high quality internal control information disclosure controlling shareholdercan has a detailed understanding of the efforts of managers and the managementcondition of the enterprise, and then they will do the best to supervision andincentive management to work hard, improve investment efficiency, realize themaximum of enterprise value.