A Study On The Proof Of Negative Fact

The demonstration of negative facts is a arduous task of great significance, onwhich the domestic researches are not satisfactory. The difficulty of proving negativefacts lies in both the formidable task of defining them and whether they could bedemonstrated, as well as in that what practical importance the demonstration of themcould contribute to. Besides, were negative facts established, the question of how todistribute the responsibility of proving them and the issue that in which way theyshould be proved, combined with these problems mentioned above, remains to befurther explored. In the light of this thought, the purpose of this article is to sort outrelative theories concerning the demonstration of negative facts.The whole passage, besides the abstract and conclusion, consists of five parts,which all together amount to30,000words.The first part serves to delineate negative facts, which not only includes negativefacts in limited terms, that is, facts that do not exist, but also embodies ones in generalterms, that is facts that does not conform to evaluation in law, enlarging the concept ofnegative facts.The second part, by evaluating the assumptions of the “theory of negative facts”,reiterates the possibility of verification of negative facts and illuminates thesignificance of substantiating negative facts, laying the theoretical foundation of thewhole passage.The third part focuses on the methods used to confirm negative facts. The authorholds that the principle of proving negative facts, no matter in general terms or innarrow ones, should be indirect corroboration, although there still exists thepossibility that the latter ones might be proven directly.The forth part primarily discusses the distribution of responsibility ofcorroborating negative facts. The author believes that it should be guided under thegeneral principle of Rosenberg’s theory that negative facts should be brought to thedomain of Substantive Law, which demands full responsibility of the litigant who insists Substantial Law prerequisite, no matter it concerns rights, or obstacle to rightsor rights expiration or rights limit, as far as negative facts are concerned.The fifth part is the extension of the last part. Since Rosenberg’s theory dependsso largely on the texture of Substantial Law that it may overlook the speciality of asingle case, undermining the execution of justice, and because, compared withpositive facts, negative facts are far more difficult to prove, it should be noted that, inthe light of justice, the burden of the responsibility of the litigate to attest to negativefacts needs to relieved to some degree, which involves the easement of lawspeculation, views demonstration and the standard of corroboration, as well as theobligation of the other side—who bear not the responsibility of providingevidence—to illuminate the case.