A Study On The Legal Regulation Of The Tying Strategy In The Network’s Two-sided Market

This thesis studies the online two-sided market tying with the adoption of legal norm and economic analyses. A method that combines theory and practice is brought up on the basis of the analysis of tying cases and their flaws.In online two-sided market, the software lift carried by platform enterprises is a special form of tying. However, the tying act here does not violate customers’ option. On the ground of the analysis of critical mass of two-sided market, positive feedback, and path dependence, this paper explains how the market failure and efficiency loss, which are caused by cross network, lead to the trend of monopoly. The author argues that in the online two-sided market, the tying act carried out by a platform enterprise which has market dominance limits competition.Suggestions for the improvement of SSNIP test and the establishment of antitrust law system are brought up in the thesis. The author suggests that a mechanism of abuse supervision should be set up so that the two-sided tying act can be regulated effectively. And the market entry barriers will be reduced due to the security of customers’ rights and the compatibility among different platforms. Consequently, the market will recover the competitive structure which is helpful to technical innovation and social welfare improvement.