Executives Shareholding Motivation, R&D Investment And Enterprise Performance

As the global economic integration and deepening of the reform of enterprise itself, in theface of increasingly fierce market competition, how to surpass competitors to obtain long-termdevelopment has become the focus of more and more enterprises. Whoever masters the latesttechnology is to gain the initiative in the development; therefore, more and more enterprisesbegin to scientific and technological innovation, and vigorously to the related R&D spending.Under the modern enterprise system, the company’s shareholders tend to through theenterprise technological innovation and the R&D input to achieve long-term development ofenterprise, the pursuit of scientific and technological innovation of the high returns, andeventually realize the goal of enterprise value maximization. Is common, however, in modernenterprises, two rights separation of the principal-agent problems, as agent of the manager willbe because of the high science and technology innovation activities of the risks of investmentand long period and avoiding R&D activities, with the enterprise shareholder form the interestsof the function, eventually harm the interests of the enterprise, is not conducive to economicgrowth and progress. Agent theory, to the long-term shareholding incentive of managers, caneffectively reduce agency cost, enterprises realize the interests of shareholders and managersfunction convergence, finally obtain the long-term development of the enterprise as well as theimprovement of performance.Based on high and new technology enterprise in our country from2009to2011,representatives of the gem listed companies as the research object, through literature andtheoretical analysis, put forward the research hypothesis and establish regression model, trying toresearch about corporate executives shareholding motivation, the relationship between R&Dinvestment and enterprise performance. Through this paper, the study found the gem listedcompanies in China, executives shareholding incentive and enterprise there exists significantpositive relationship between R&D input, executives shareholding in larger enterprises, R&Dinvestment and enterprise performance were positively correlated relationship, executiveownership incentives conducive to the increase of corporate R&D input, and improve andimprove enterprise performance.