Empirical Research On Equity Control Path, Agency Conflicts And External Audit Requirements

Ownership is highly concentrated in China’s transition economy, the agencyproblem stems mainly from listed companies the conflict between major shareholdersand external medium and small investors. This is due to the particularity of the capitalmarket in China, most listed companies is made from a traditional state-ownedenterprise restructuring, the government as the ultimate control person listed companiescaused by direct or indirect implementation of holding. Equity control of complicatedpath control level, and the expansion of enterprise scale, new agency conflicts caused bythe structure of rights and interests of may will be more and more outstanding. If you donot take effective checks and balances, proxy conflict not only can not effectively curbbut have intensified trend. The introduction of external audit, particularly high qualityaudit and other exogenous independent supervision main body to alleviate agencyconflict is likely to become the inevitable orientation of constraint mechanism design. Inview of this, this article regarding the equity control path, the agency conflict andexternal audit supervision and control level, external demand, equity concentration andexternal quality audit customer surplus information content of audit, etc, put forward theresearch hypothesis., and through the empirical research on the four assumptions areverified, the following conclusion: as the control hierarchy, the more the agency conflictbetween controlling shareholders and minority shareholders becomes more of a problem;In other conditions under the condition of the same high quality auditing demand andenterprise agency conflict, positive correlation between enterprise agency cost is higher,the greater the demand for high quality audit; High quality auditing demand andpositively to the relationship between ownership concentration, and with the increase ofequity concentration, the growing demand for the high quality audit will increase; Inother conditions under the condition of the same high quality external audit customersurplus information content is higher, and the agency costs and weak negativerelationship between the surplus value relevance in without external audit quality auditof enterprises.This article on the structure is divided into five chapters. The first chapterintroduction, summarizes the research background and puts forward problems, theresearch status at home and abroad were reviewed and summarized and reviewed in thispaper, research significance and methods of the thesis, etc. The second chapter first appropriation of funds, the largest shareholder ownership concentration and equitybalance degree, the state shareholder in the corporate governance structure andgovernance effect analysis; Secondly summarized simply traditional agency conflictsand new conflicts; Finally the external audit demand and the analysis function and otherrelated content. The third chapter of equity control path in China, agency conflicts andthe demand for high quality audit of listed companies in China equity situation isanalyzed. Chapter iv tested under economic transition at present in our country, equitycontrol path, the high quality auditing demand and enterprises the relationship betweenthe agency conflict, and the other the relationship between the governance mechanisms.The fifth chapter summarizes the thesis research conclusion, and put forward policySuggestions, points out that the shortcomings of this study and the direction of furtherresearch.