The Major Shareholder Of Assets Into The Violations And Control Strategy Research

In recent years, the corporate governance model of high concentration shareholdingand controlled by large shareholders is becoming more and more common in emergingmarket countries, which generated large numbers of listed companies existing relatedtransactions and the lack of transparency, in addition, the binding force of law is notenough to listed companies, so the benefit of small shareholders is invaded by largeshareholders. In Chinese capital market which is in a transitional economic systemenvironment, the phenomenon of "one share dominance" is common, with the arrival ofnon-tradable share reform, a huge stream of listed companies’strong stockholders injectingassets into listed companies have appeared. Under an economic environment whose marketmechanism is failed, supervision mechanism is not complete, corporate governance isimperfect and large shareholders are common existent, it is very likely that assets-injectingbecome a breeding ground to convey profits to large shareholders. the action of profitstunneling infringe to the interests of small shareholders, as a consequence, that brought outadverse effects to stock market and listed companies, so it is important to protect smallshareholders.This dissertation based on the theory of corporate governance and merger&reorganization, analyzed the direct and institutional causes of large shareholders invading,and analyzed the major invading methods of large shareholders, that are including thescopes of assets reorganization. This dissertation summarized the situation of Chineselisted companies’ shareholder assets-injecting, and entirely analyzed the invading methodsof large shareholders in assets-injecting. The demonstration in this dissertation tested themodel of large stockholders invading degree in assets-injecting, and came to followingconclusions: the shareholding ratio of the largest shareholder has the non-linearrelationship with the degree of the large shareholder invading; the ratio of the largeshareholder shareholding ratio to the shareholding ratio summation from the secondshareholder to the tenth shareholder is positively related with the degree of invading; thenumber of supervisory committee members increasing result in the degree of the largestshareholder invading increasing. By analyzing the large stockholder profit compensationmechanisms of a listed company ’Sichuan Shuangma’, Found that either the spontaneouscorrection mechanism of market or the mandatory correction mechanism of governmentand law cannot restrain the invading of large stockholder, under the environment of currentChinese capital market. In final, this dissertation gave some countermeasures to control theinvading of large stockholders.