A Study On The Relationship Between The External Supervision Mechanism And R&D Investment In Manufacturing Enterprises

Competition is the constant theme of economic society, the enterprise wants togain the competitive advantage and excess profits continued, it must constantlyenhance the level of R&D, increase the R&D investment to keep up with the needs ofmarket. But the problem of internal control of enterprise existed, it damage the profitsof stakeholders and make a bad influence to the investment decisions of enterprise.It’s also a impact to the sustainable development of enterprise. In the current, thedishonest management behaviors such as executive flight, financial fraud seriouslyhurts the enthusiasm of investors, which causes the great damage to the enterprises’R&D investment. Therefore, from the perspective of external supervision mechanism,we put the stakeholders into the corporate governance to reduce the bad influencesabout R&D investment from the internal control problems.By using the2006-2011data about the A shares listed manufacturing companiesin shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange, we empirical analysis the effect of theindependent director, supervisor, institutional investors, creditors and the independentaudit of the external oversight mechanisms for enterprise R&D investment. Firstlyintroduced the development status of China’s manufacturing industry enterprises’R&D investment and external supervision mechanism, and introduced the mechanismof action of external supervision mechanism, R&D investment and corecompetitiveness. Then set the research hypotheses on the basis of theories, andestablish the regression model. Using Excel and Eviews6.0, we make the statisticalanalysis about the variable data, and using panel data to test and analysis the model,and concluded the Influence of external supervision mechanism of manufacturingenterprise to R&D investment.The empirical results are: the relationship of independent board proportion andthe enterprise R&D is not significant; the relationship of proportion of outsidesupervisors and R&D investment is significant; the proportion of institutionalinvestors holding, the asset-liability ratio and R&D investment is significantlynegative relationship; independent auditing and corporate R&D investment is asignificant positive relationship, and the relationship of the other control variables andcorporate R&D investment is significant. We make the sample into state-owned andnon-state-owned, found in the state-owned enterprise the relationship of independentdirectors and corporate R&D is negative, but it’s not significant. But it’s significant positive relationship in the non-state-owned enterprise. The conclusion is justdifferent in the significant. Finally, we put forward some suggestions to improve theexternal supervision mechanism.