Research On Deposit Insurance System Under The Perspective Of Market Constraints

Since the Asian financial crisis happened in1997, especially ten years later, thelarge-scaled financial crisis had broken out in the United States again. More and morecountries and regions began to take a new look at the banks’ systemic risk, so to create aexplicit deposit insurance system is regarded as a magic weapon to prevent all the people runon a bank. For a long time, our country has been taking a method of government’s recessiveprotection, however, this kind of invisible deposit insurance system not only caused thegovernment’s heavy financial burden, but also adverse to the banks’ fair competition andbenign development. Building an explicit deposit insurance system is a key subject to ourcountry’s academic circles. The Chinese government have gradually issued the relevant lawsand regulations to put the academic theory into the actual operation. The relevant departmentsin our country are formulating the related policies, laws and regulations to protect the explicitdeposit insurance system. But explicit deposit insurance system is a "double-edged sword",which should be designed and operated reasonably to make it play in a proper role.With themarket constrains,as one of the the New Basel Agreement in banking supervision of the “threebig pillar”,it has gradually boarded in the stage of history,and it has a strong theoreticalmeaning and realistic meaning to study how will the market restraint the elements to join theestablishment of the deposit insurance system in our country so as to effectively play themarket constraints and deposit insurance the dual role of the new angle of view,the researchon China’s deposit insurance system construction and how to operate the issues.In thisassay,processed from the upcoming release of market restraint mechanism and explicit depositinsurance system in our country, based on the integrated utilization of information economicsand institutional economics related theory, after the summarization of the related concepts andthe existing research,firstly, it has analyzed the adverse effect on China’s financial industrycaused by the contact deposit insurance system;and then, through the panel data modelanalysis on15Banks risk, verified the contact deposit insurance system in China was in agreat extent weaken our country market constraints power, and in the long run to the positivedevelopment of the banking industry. Secondly, the paper has interpreted the necessity andfeasibility of the establishment of China’s explicit deposit insurance system.Thirdly, it hascarried on the contrast analysis on the international development trend of deposit insurancesystem based on the perspective of market restraint. Ultimately,combined with our country’sactual conditions and international experience and based on the angle of view on marketconstraint, from the deposit insurance system of the main duties and objective orientation,organization form and fund sources, insured qualifications, the highest limit of and insuredrate and so on to carry on the design, so as to establish China’s market constraints and deposit insurance incentive compatibility of the deposit insurance system to provide theoreticalsupport, and promote the healthy and stable development of finance industry in China.