Institutional Investors Held Shares On Executive Compensation Incentives

Today，institutional investors have occupied half of the securities market, theyare the power rising briskly in the past20years, it’s impact on the corporategovernance has caused strong concern of the academic and practical circles. Thenwhat kind of impact can the institutional investors exert on the classic problem in theon corporate governance——"manager control" problem? To the very sensitivecurrent issues——executive compensationy, what is the role of institutionalinvestors can play?Based on research samples of the Shenzhen and Shanghai two stock markets in2007-2011A-share listed companies that has the institutional investorshareholding,author carry on empirical research. After the regression test on theoverall data, based on the basic situation of listed companies in China will groupingsamples according to the actual controller type and region contrast research. Researchfound that: the institutional investor shareholding and executive compensation oflisted company level and executive compensation performance sensitivity weresignificantly positive correlation; Compared with the state-owned listed companies,institutional investors for non-state-owned listed companies level of executivecompensation and executive compensation performance sensitivity effect is bigger;Relative to the less developed areas of listed companies, institutional investors oflisted companies in developed areas level of executive compensation and executivecompensation performance sensitivity of influence is greater.The first chapter is for the introduction. This chapter elaborated this articleresearch background, research significance, research content and innovation points,related concepts defined and listed paper outline.The second chapter is literature review. This chapter reviews the relatedliterature in this field at home and abroad.The third chapter is theoretical analysis. This chapter firstly summarizes theprincipal-agent theory, contract mechanism and supervision mechanism two aspects as a breakthrough point, related to management incentive theory and summarized Toinstitutional investors and executives of listed companies the necessity and possibilitywere analyzed.The forth chapter is the research design. This chapter on the basis of thehypothesis is put forward in this paper, the research hypothesis, confessed to thespecific part of the empirical research, including: sample data source and dataselection criteria, in this paper, the definition of important variables and theconstruction of regression model.The fifth chapter is the empirical test results and analysis. In this chapter for atotal of4430samples from2008to2011the following operations: descriptivestatistics, correlation analysis and the multicollinearity test, finally to regression testsamples. Overall sample test sample test sequence is as follows:(1);(2) points insample test;(3) inspection points and control the people category. Inspection resultswere compared. Finally, in order to ensure stable robustness inspection results.The sixth chapter conclude research prospects. This chapter summed up finalconclusion, and pointed out in this paper, the shortcomings of the research directionwas discussed. Finally this field of research...