An Empirical Study On Listed Companies’ Ultimate Control Characteristics And Corporate Operating Risk

The problem of corporate governance is the level of traditional agency problemsremain in the major shareholder of the company holding or shareholders, mainlythrough the entrenchment effect that managers on the direct controlling shareholderinterests infringed on the listing Corporation, thus affecting the performance of thecompany development. This paper will focus on the other dimension of CorporatePerformance--performance fluctuation, choose2009-2011years the Shanghai andShenzhen two city A shares of listing Corporation of data for the study sample, backthrough the associated enterprises control chain layers, find out the ultimate controllerto listing Corporation, and learn from the collective decision-making theory andagency theory, by using the statistical method of multiple linear regression. Finally,we make a comprehensive study of the relationship between ultimate controller’scharacteristics and firm risk. This paper not only enriches the existing researchliterature, to make up for the gap of ultimate controller’s characteristics of businessrisk, more from the test results of the ultimate controlling shareholder "tunneling"listing Corporation getting more deep-seated reason, in order to prevent thecontrolling shareholder invading small and medium investors to provide more basis,and to our country how to improve the corporate governance structure, the protectionof investors and shareholders put forward policy suggestion.Based on the above analysis, this paper takes2009-2011years the Shanghai andShenzhen two city A shares of listing Corporation data as the research object.According to the annual CSMAR database listing Corporation to the financial dataand corporate governance information disclosure, we are on the ultimate controllerattribute, cash flow rights, control rights, separation of two rights, control structurediagram and related financial indicators for each collection, collation. Then we putdata into the SPASS18.0and have the resulting regression.We found, non state-owned listing Corporation face greater risks than thestate-owned listing Corporation. Because non state-owned listing Corporationmanagers have more decision-making power and the greater the egoism behavior, andthese companies face more uncertainty about the business environment. In thestate-owned listing Corporation, degree of separation of two rights and company management risk is positive correlation. Separation of two rights existing makes getsame income, the risk is small. the owner vacancy phenomenon existing State-OwnedCompany prefer to complete private interests and make more risky investmentdecision, thus to bring greater business risk. In addition, the management risk controlchain level and state-owned listing Corporation is positive correlation, board size andfirm size is negatively correlated with the business risk.