The Strength Of The Asymmetric Impact On Game Strategy Selected

The evolution of cooperation is very important for the understanding of cooperationand competition. The conclusions of the study on the evolution of cooperation are notonly the key subjects in biology, but also have an important impact on human society.The explanation of cooperation evolution and stability maintenance mechanisms ofcollaboration system stability has been a hot research topic in biology, economics, andsocial scientists. In the existing research on the evolution of cooperation, biologistsapproach through the analysis of biological experimental data, and use game theoryand model simulation. Basing on the Prisoner’s Dilemma principles, sociologists andeconomists mainly design different experimental prisoner’s dilemma to collect thedata, and then make some relevant conclusions through the statistical analysis. Inbiology and sociology, most studies are based on the idea of symmetry, however,asymmetry widely exist in biological ecosystems and human society. Asymmetrymainly exists in three forms: unequal strength, different co-evolution path or pathwayand asymmetric information. In the existing research on asymmetric strength,asymmetry mainly involves the difference of policy choices and their gains, the studyalso relates to the initial asymmetric strength. Unfortunately, the initial asymmetricstrength only reflects one point of asymmetric strength. There is a little study onasymmetrical strength throughout the game. In our approach, we study how theasymmetric strength has the impact on game strategy selection, and then explore howhuman behavior evolve and maintian the cooperation system stability will be how tomaintain.Like most researchers, basing on the principle and the model of the Prisoner’sDilemma, this article also designs different experiments to collect data, and then studythe evolution of human behavior through the analysis of the data. The basic principleof the experiment is the iterated prisoner’s dilemma. But in our experiments, eachparticipant has three choices: cooperation, defection and punishment. On basis ofDreber et al (2008) experiment T1, we set different experimental initial conditions. As the experiment progresses, the strength of participants is gradually changing in twoforms: first, as the experiment progresses, the initial equal strength is graduallychanging; second, as the experiment progresses, the initial unequal strength isgradually changing. To completely reflects the changes of the asymmetric strength inthe game, and participants are well aware of the strength of the opponent, we set twotype experiment with the initial score50vs.50and50vs.100, and always display thegame scores of two sides during the whole experiment. After the necessarypre-processing of experimental data, we use non-parametric test and model analysismethod to study how asymmetric strength has an impact on game strategy selection.Studies found that the group of unequal strength tend to use more cooperationstrategies and less defection strategies than the group of equal strength. As theunequal degree became larger, the cooperation rate is increased and defection rate isdecreased. That is, the larger unequal strength, the higher cooperation rate. On thecontrary, the larger equal strength, the higher confliction rate. Further studies showthat weak participants tend to use more cooperation strategies, but strong participantstend to use more defection strategies in the interior of unequal group. In addition, theco-recipient rewards cooperator and punishes one who destroy cooperation in thesystem of asymmetric strength.