Empirical Study Debt Maturity Structure And Company Performance Under Ownership

It’s very important about debt financing is business decisions of companies. Asan important financing method, debt financing is different from the equity financing,it needs servicing. When companies consider debt financing, they should consider thebest financing structure, which includes not only the problem of how to balance theproportion of debt financing and equity financing, also related to the choice of debtmaturity. Debt maturity structure is referred to as “long-short-term liabilities of eachshare in the share of total corporate debt, the paper select indicator is the proportion oflong-term debt." Debt maturity structure of the debt financing is an important branchof the theory. And it attracts more and more scholars at home and abroad. Foreignresearch scholars on theoretical and empirical research largely based on the“principal-agent theory, signaling theory, tax theory and matching term theory”.Because of special institutional and underdeveloped bond market in China, it resultedin a preference for the company in equity financing, debt financing also tend toshort-term debt financing, and a high proportion of short-term debt, long-term debtratio is significantly lower. The debt financing structure is imbalance.According to the principal-agent theory, the debt maturity structure efficiencymake positive effect to shareholders and operators of the companies. It reflects in theshareholders’ constraints and control mechanisms, and operators incentive andrestraint mechanisms. For the nature of Chinese listed companies under differentownership, it is different in the system size, business model. So the debt maturitystructure efficiencies are also different in effective.The existence of “soft budget constraint ", it make the state-owned listedcompanies, comparing to other companies, obtain loans directly from banks withlower interest rates and longer maturities of long-term loans. For non-state-ownedlisted companies, banks consider them more risks in management and control, theyhave a sound system of risk assessment, poor credit companies are almost impossibleto get loans from banks, better credit companies are just short-term loans.In this paper, we analyze the correlation between debt maturity structure andcorporate performance theoretically, and explore the interaction mechanism betweenthem. We focus on the perspective of the company performance feedback mechanisms to debt maturity structure of exploration and research. By combing the large numberof documents, we based on the construction model, comparatively demonstrate theperformance of state-owned listed companies and non-state-owned listed company’sdebt maturity structure and corporate performanceIn this paper, we make the principal-agent theory as the theoretical basis, bychoosing between2011-2012listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen A-sharelisted companies in manufacturing1183financial data for the study, including415state-owned listed companies,768non-state-owned listed companies. By establishingthe regression model, we performed regression analysis to debt maturity structure asthe dependent variable and corporate performance as independent variables. Then weinvestigated state-owned listed company data and non-state-owned listed companydata. The results show that the debt maturity structure of non-state-owned listedcompanies and its corporate performance negatively correlated which consistent withthe principal-agent theory conclusions. In the state-owned listed companies, there isno significant correlation between them, indicating that the “soft budget constraint”theory may affect presence of institutional maturity structure of the debt instate-owned listed companies, this may be the case of China-specific circumstances.Therefore, we put some suggestions to the research.