Ownership Structure, Governance Mechanism And Risk-taking Behavior Of Commercial Bank In China

Since the1980s, much of the global financial crisis incidents caused people to focus on the corporate governance of commercial Banks. Then southeast Asia financial crisis caused enormous damage to the world economy,but also exposed a number of major defects of the banking corporate governance. The U.S. subprime mortgage crisis in2007from a macro is excess liquidity, said financial institutions of governance mechanism from the microcosmic problems. In recent years, the management of Banks and risk behavior relations become an important research direction. Gradually along with our country economic system reform and the implementation of the RMB exchange rate, interest rate system reform, accelerating the pace of financial innovation in our country, the shareholding system reform continued to deepen commercial Banks in China since2004and corporate governance. Therefore, in the domestic and foreign research under the background of China’s commercial bank ownership structure and risk behavior is very important.Before the mid-1990-s, the corporate governance of commercial Banks is considered important to regulators, until after the97southeast Asian financial crisis, commercial Banks corporate governance is concerned by people, became the regulated commercial Banks by regulators. For a long time, mainly from regulatory capital for Banks’ risk problems, market discipline to study, but the effects of ownership structure on bank’s risk people seldom go to study, bank risk-taking behavior that is largely shareholders risk-taking motives and shareholders through corporate governance mechanisms to achieve effects on bank risk behaviors. Can, therefore, from the perspective of the ownership structure, corporate governance mechanism as the intermediate variable, to study the risk behaviors of the bank. This paper is an attempt to do so, and based on the theoretical research has carried on the empirical analysis, proved the point of view, to perfect the listed Banks ownership structure and governance mechanism in our country, reduce the bank risk has important theoretical significance and practical significance.This article is divided into four parts. The first part is preface, firstly elaborated the paper’s writing purpose and significance, followed by scholars at home and abroad related research literature review, then is the writing ideas and framework of this article, the last is the innovation and shortage. First in the second part of equity structure and corporate governance mechanism and related theory, reviewed the development of the equity of listed commercial Banks in China process, and analyzes the equity structure of China’s listed commercial Banks present situation, analyzed on the basis of reference to related research how ownership structure through the internal governance mechanism and external governance mechanism affect bank risk behaviors. The third part is the empirical study, through the establishment of panel data model, the14listed commercial Banks in2009-2011, three years of data, use risk-weighted assets to total assets ratio is as explained variable, with the first big shareholder’s shareholding, the second to the tenth largest holding ownership and state-owned ownership, board size, the number of independent directors, executive pay, capital adequacy, seven factors as explanatory variables, with assets and return on total assets as control variables to empirically test the previous theory analysis. The fourth part is the conclusion and the suggestion, the empirical results show that a listed commercial Banks in China is the largest shareholder ownership and bank risk behaviors were "inverted U" type of relationship; Second to the tenth largest shareholder ownership and risk behaviors are related to the sum, failed to play a role of shareholders’ equity checks and balances; Positively related to the government ownership and the risks to Banks; Executive pay is positively related to the bank’s risk; Independent directors failed to play a role; The higher capital adequacy ratio, the lower the risks to Banks; Another bank assets, the greater the risk is lower, the total assets of yields high risk higher. On the basis of combining the above analysis, this paper on China’s listed commercial Banks how to optimize the equity structure, improve the corporate governance mechanism, reduce the risk assets are proposed.