Empirical Study On Corporate Governance Of Private And Performance

Entering the market economy era, China’s private enterprises has changed in scale, institution, boundary and entrepreneurship. It has become an important pillar of our economy. In2009, the growth enterprises market was established, a large number of small and medium-sized private enterprises, including a lot of family enterprises have been listed. Accompanied by this, the corporate governance problems of private enterprise began to surface. Therefore, this paper researches the similarities and differences between the family and non-family enterprises on the relation between corporate governance structure and performance, listing on the growth enterprises market in china, in order to improve the governance of private enterprise.This paper makes a reasonable assumption based on the theory of corporate governance and the theory of company performance, constructs a reasonable index system, and analyses the2011data of the private listed companies on the GEM by quantile regression, deeply discusses the differences and changes in the relationship between governance and performance of family listed companies and the other listed companies in different sub-sites, making a detailed analysis of the causes.The research findings show that the largest shareholder’s control of the non-family listed companies and ROE are positively correlated but not very significantly at each quantile. While the control force of the largest shareholder and the performance of the family companies are positively correlated at the lower quantiles and the correlation degree is weaker than non-family listing corporation, but negative correlated at the middle and high quantiles. After removing the influence of the industry factor, the largest shareholder control and corporate performance of family listed companies is more significant positive at the middle quantile.There is a positive correlation between the executive stock ownership and performance of non-family listed companies. And the coefficient increases with the increase of quantile. There is a positive correlation between the executive stock ownership and performance of family listed companies. But the coefficient of each quantile is less. This difference increases as the quantile rises. The differences become smaller but more significant after removing the impact of industry factors.The top three executives’ total remuneration and performance of the non-family listed companies was positively correlated, and significant at low and middle quantiles. The top three executives’ total remuneration and performance of the family listed companies was positively correlated, and the coefficient of each quantile is greater than non-family companies. Stewardship theory does not apply in the family listed companies.According to the conclusions of the empirical, this paper puts forward to adjust ownership structure according to the actual situation, reasonably control the proportion of executive stock ownership and effectively formulate the executive compensation mechanism.