The Empirical Study Of The Ultimate Control Of Listed Companies And Company Performance

As China’s listed companies began to disclosed company’s control relations in the annual report from2004, more and more scholars began to focus on the issues of the ultimate control of listed companies-related, and make a lot of research. The article uses the ultimate controlling shareholder’s control rights as entry point, chose the Shanghai Stock Exchange listed companies in all industries as a sample, through the method of descriptive statistical analysis and empirical test, systematic analysis the differences arising from the different control of company, to examine how the control variable influence the level of company performance, and then seek ways to improve standards and measures of company performance.First the article introduction some of the theory of corporate governance, and then descript the ultimate control and the basic theory of company performance, so as to get ready for the theoretical basis of empirical research. Finally, analysis of company performance and the ultimate control over the relationship, and then established relevant models to analysis of ultimate control over the four variables:control ratio, equity separation, level control and the nature of the ultimate controlling shareholder. Through the analysis we gain five conclusions.(1) the company’s level of performance and control changes in the proportion of U-shaped relationship;(2) the level of the company’s performance and equity changes in inverse proportion separation;(3) company shareholders of the ultimate control and separation between equity inversely proportional relationship;(4) the company’s performance levels and control levels are positively correlated;(5) If the ultimate controller of the company is non-state nature, the company’s operating efficiency higher than the ultimate controller of the company is state-owned. Finally, we come to these conclusions are based from the companies, investors, as the ultimate controller of shareholder, regulatory and the legal system point of view put forward five points for the improvement of the ultimate controlling shareholder control structures in order to improve company performance:(1) companies should reduce the degree of deviation from the controlling shareholder of the shares, and choose a relatively major shareholders holding more than one way;(2) investors should be concern with the control of the company over the situation and trends, the company’s ultimate controlling shareholders of the relevant detailed understanding of the situation, and then combined with other information considered reasonable to make the final decision-making;(3) government departments should design a more comprehensive state-owned assets management system;(4) government and regulatory authorities must require a listed company and the ultimate controlling shareholder of the company’s controller and other related information to give complete, accurate and timely disclosure to ensure that stakeholders have a good grasp of corporate control of information, protect their legitimate interests;(5) to improve our legal system, establish the effective protection of minority shareholders and the practical legal system is the root to solve our country law enforcement efficiency and legal rights of shareholders.