| In recent years, with the reforming of China’s banking system, state-ownedcommercial banks have made great progress in the market-oriented transformation,bank credit’s external constraints for borrowing enterprises has much strengthen.Especially after the2008financial crisis, China’s regulatory authorities draw lessonsfrom foreign experience and have further strengthen the supervision of thecommercial bank credit risk. This provides a new opportunity to study the effect ofbank creditor’s rights to the enterprise investment decision-making.Based on the background of financial crisis, this paper separates bank debt fromcorporate liabilities, and develops a framework that focuses on the role of bank debtin dealing conflicts among shareholders, managers and creditors, then uses the newlyresearch achievements of debt governance theory through the theoretical andempirical methods. There are three conclusions. Firstly, after the financial crisis, theinefficient investment of listed companies mainly appears as under-investment ratherthan over-investment. Secondly, bank debt has constraint effect on enterpriseover-investment, but only significant at the5%level, and this effect mainly derivesfrom short-term loans, long-term borrowing no similar effect. Thirdly, bank debt alsocan relieve enterprise under-investment, further analysis shows long-term loan cansignificantly ease the under-investment, and short-term loan is not significant in thisaspect. Overall, these results indicate that China’s bank debt governance effect of thecorporate inefficient investment has begun to work, but not fully yet.Finally to promote the bank debt’s corporate governance effect, the followingsuggestions are given: continue to reform the commercial bank system, perfect themain bank system, and improve the bank’s ability to negotiate and the utilization levelof restrictions, strength bank’s finance function and information transfer function. |
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