The Study On Relationship Of Ownership Structure Anf Investment Efficiency

Investment,financing and dividend destribution are the three main activities for enterprise,and investment is one of the most important financial decisions.lt is the major force driving enterprise’s growth and the foundation for cash flow in the future.Investment activity has a direct impact on enterprises’ performance,meanwhile it influence investors’ prospection towards enterprise value in the capital market.Thus, it proves great significance of study on investment efficiency.As a major institutional arrangement among corporate governance.ownership structure has an significant influence on corporate governance and is bound to affect investment efficiency.So many scholars take extensively research on the enterprise’s investment.Among the recent studies,most of them mainly analysis the main shareholders’ occupation of interets of minority shareholders,but from the perspetive of ultimate controller according to the specific governance environment in China may be more innovative, which is the point of this paper.This study based on the corporate governance theory,agency theory,asymmetric information theory to analysis ownership structure’s impact on investment efficiency,then posed the hypothesis.In order to in-depth research,this paper analysis ownership from perspectives of ultimate controller,the separation between cash flow rights and control rights,the ownership concentration and so forth.In this paper,the non-financial companies listed in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchange market are selected as samples,spanning from year2008to year2012.This paper contain two-step empirical analysisi.Firstly,we use the Richardson’s residual model to measure the efficiency of investment,then divide samples into over-investment groups and under-investment groups according to the residual’s value,more than zero or less than zero and study the different characterization of exlanatory variables in different groups.The results show that:ownership concentration increase the inefficient investmet,especially over-investment; blockholders could reduce inefficient investment to some extent in under-investment groups;and the separation of control right and cash flow right deteriorated investment efficiency.For different ultimate controller,the impact of ownership structure is also different.In state owned groups, the separation of control right and cash flow right more likely lead to over-investment,while in non-state owned groups, the separation of control right and cash flow right more likely lead to under-investment.The paper provides a new discovery about our ownership structure on the efficiency of investment,which has important theoretical and practical significance.Finally,we propose a series of policy recommendations aimed at the actual situation of listed enterprises,and state our research deficiencies and prospects in the future research.