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Debt Financing And Cash Flow Of Overinvestment

Posted on:2015-03-16Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:Y F LuFull Text:PDF
GTID:2269330425989337Subject:Accounting
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
As two basic financial activities, investment and financing behavior has been the hot topic of the theory and practice. The conventional view, points out that investment and financing are two independent concepts, investment behavior does not exist the financing constraint problem. However, with the deepening of the research, Scholars agree that they are not independent of each other. Investing and financing activities are connected with each other. On one hand, Enterprise financing behavior can not blindly follow. Enterprise investment needs should be considered. On the other hand, the investment activities of the enterprise should set up on the basis of their own financing ability. This paper combed the shareholders and creditors of the efficiency of investment behavior, shareholders and managers conflict leads to excessive investment behavior, the influence of different period of debt on investment, and the influence of different sources of debt on investment. This article uses the theory of principal-agent, optimal sequence financing from the perspective of debt financing to study the influence on enterprises investment behavior. This article selects data from2003to2011Chinese manufacturing listed companies as research samples. And the sample as a whole is divided into state-owned and non-state-owned listed companies. Based on free cash flow as control variable, this paper focuses on the study of debt and the debt of different period, different sources of debt’s influence on the enterprise investment behavior, respectively.The results showed that:first of all, Manufacturing listed companies in China are widespread excessive investment behavior. Second, Debt financing can’t restrain enterprise investment behavior. Again, both short-term and long-term debt in the study of the influence of the enterprise investment behavior, found that short-term debt in the enterprise can inhibit the excessive investment behavior. The mechanism of the effect of long-term debt of non-state-owned listed companies is better than the sample as a whole and the state-owned listed companies. Finally, from the perspective of debt from different sources to research, found that commercial credit not play the role of inhibiting excessive investment. Bank loan financing in the whole sample and non-state-owned listed companies have the effect of inhibiting excessive investment, but not show it in the state-owned enterprises.
Keywords/Search Tags:debt financing, excessive investment, governance mechanism
PDF Full Text Request
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