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Implicit Ultimate Control Rights And Enterprise Financing Structure Choice

Posted on:2014-01-28Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:F F GuoFull Text:PDF
GTID:2269330425989629Subject:Accounting
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
The different combinations of ownership and control rights constitute different ownership structure of the company. The modern company management concept advocates the principle that one share-one vote. The purpose is to reduce the moral hazard of the big shareholders and control gains. The "stock" is a representative of the shareholders’ actual shares, also called cash flow rights;"right" refers to the shareholders’ direct or indirect actual voting rights which reflects the company’s actual control power, also called the final control. Since the1990s, the corporate governance research gradually extended to other countries outside the United States. The study found that there are varying degrees of concentration on a global scale. Much of the shareholders control the company indirectly through the pyramid structure and cross holding, double voting controlling ways. Because of this control method has certain concealment and confusing, investors and small and medium-sized shareholders cannot clearly identify who is the company’s actual controller, therefore, the recessive ultimate control can be defined the rights which the company’s actual controller indirectly owed through the above ways. The development of the securities market in our country has its specific period and background, market supervision of the securities market and resource allocation is not perfect. The phenomenon that one share-different vote is very serious, especially for the private listed companies of our country. The descriptive statistical results from the SSE is the two rights separation ratio of0.63of the private listed companies is far higher than that of state-owned listed company two rights separation ratio0.92.So the phenomenon that Implicit control rights of the private listed companies is more serious.This text adopts sample that private listed firm of the Shenzhen SE nearly three years, analyzed the recessive ultimate control over how to influence corporate financing structure decision and the main factors of this kind of influence. The article is divided into six parts, the first part is introduction, mainly introduces the research background of the article, references and research methods. The second part mainly analyzes recessive ultimate control and relevant theories of financing structure and defines the recessive ultimate control and the concept of financing structure. The third part introduces recessive ultimate control of private listed companies in our country and the present situation of the financing structure, separation of private listed company be satisfactory status source of funding by a data graph and data table form was summarized and analyzed, and the ultimate controlling shareholder is put forward using implicit ultimate control of the impact of financing structure model assumptions and design research. The fourth part descriptives survey the content of the aforementioned assumptions and empirical validation and draw the corresponding structure; put forward the appropriate policy recommendations.
Keywords/Search Tags:Implicit ultimate control rights, The private listed company, Financingstructure
PDF Full Text Request
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