Research On Controlling Shareholder’s Embezzlement Of Funds、Auditor Reputation And Audit Opinion

New market environment of economic transition and the reform of non-tradable shares of listed companies, cause large shareholders and minority shareholders in our country widespread conflicts of interest. Because the minority shareholders protection mechanism is not sound, the big shareholders’behavior of market restraint mechanism has not yet been established, large shareholders through the way of funds occupation harm the interests of the listed companies and minority shareholders. Controlling shareholder’s embezzlement of funds has hindered the normal production and business operation activities of listed companies and restricted the healthy development of capital market.On Europe and the United States and other more mature western capital market,as an important standard to judge the level of audit quality, to a certain extent,audit can ease the agency conflict. Controlling shareholder’s embezzlement of funds is an important form of principal-agent conflict. This paper use it as measure index of agent conflicts. In our country, the capital market is still not mature capital market. We study if audit mechanism can alleviate agency conflict, supervise controlling shareholder’s, maintain the transparency of China’s capital market. According to the signal transduction mechanism, Auditor reputation is an important standard to judge the level of audit quality, to eliminate the information asymmetry phenomenon in audit market. Auditor reputation is high, whether audit quality is higher, the high reputation auditors and low reputation auditors when issue the final audit opinion whether differences, has been the important topic of accounting circles at home and abroad research. According to the firm’s comprehensive evaluation rankings, firms can be divided into "ten big" and "non-ten". Combining with specific features of the listing Corporation, the inspection of controlling shareholder’s embezzlement of funds by the type of audit opinion on the "big ten" and "non-ten" whether there are differences. This paper selects2009-2011a-share listed companies as research samples, empirical testing, get the following conclusion:Auditors issue non-standard audit opinions on controlling shareholder’s embezzlement of funds, auditor reputation is higher, the greater the probability of non-standard audit opinions issued by.To solve the problem of controlling shareholder’s embezzlement of funds, protect the interests of minority shareholders, we should actively build an inner mechanism of large shareholders and minority shareholders interests equilibrium, attaches great importance to the independent director’s function, strengthen the company’s accounting information disclosure, establish an effective mechanism of external audit governance. In particular, give full play to the supervision of the external audit governance function, actively promote public accounting firm to do bigger and stronger, improve the quality of audit services and foster good reputation of auditors. In addition, we should improve CPA practice environment. To improve the quality of their financial information disclosure, listed companies should take the initiative to choose the high reputation of auditors for their services and increase the demand for high reputation of auditors.