Family Control、degree Of Market And The Transparency Of Information

The core function of the capital market is efficient allocation of resources, and its essence is the main market for the main types of accounting information in order to analyze the information and judgment, and expect enterprise resources to be used to predict the efficiency of the process. Information disclosure of listed companies is an important bridge and link for capital markets and listed companies, it is an important tool to solve the problem of information asymmetry, it affects the efficiency of capital market and social efficiency of resource allocation.Existing research found that information disclosure level of private enterprises is lower than other types of enterprises mainly due to pyramid structures, cross-shareholdings or dual ownership of private listed company, etc., resulting in a higher degree of separation of ownership and increase the ultimate controlling shareholder to grab control over the self-interest of motivation and ability, and thus affect the information disclosure policies and transparency of listed company (Junqiu Wang et al.,2008). But back to the actual controller specifically, we found that, when the actual control or family member who is a natural person, which is family-controlled businesses, the separation of ownership is often very high, and they suffered less external constraints, such a company emptied more motivation and capability in order to avoid regulation, they tend to disguise their hollowed behavior of listed companies to manipulate the information disclosure policy which result in the lower quality of information disclosure. While other private listed company’s actual controller primarily are country or the agency, employee stock ownership or trade unions, collective enterprises, etc., which are non-family-controlled companies, although there are also some separation of ownership issue, but they have lower level of separation of ownership and more subject to external constraints, they do not exist to get control over the motives of self-interest, So for the benefit of listed companies is also less embezzled, the level of disclosure of such companies is better than the family-controlled companies.Family businesses are across the country, although listed companies from different regions are in the same country. But on the regional market, the process of government intervention and the rule of law level differ greatly. The degree of protection for investors there must be different in different external institutional environment, it also affects the disclosure quality of listed company information.To better understand the information disclosure quality problems of family-controlled enterprise, the paper use private enterprises listed on the Main Board of Shenzhen A-shares in2009-2011as samples, discuss the complexity of family-controlled companies and the shareholding structure which led to the high degree of separation of ownership and control level and widening impact on the quality of information disclosure, and introduced into degree of market indicators as the external governance environment reactor to test the influence on poor quality of family-controlled corporate disclosure.Through research we find that the information disclosure quality of family-controlled enterprise is worse than non-family-controlled companies. Its poor quality of information disclosure is due to family-controlled enterprise complex shareholding structure with high degree of separation of ownership which triggered the second category agency conflicts, the introduction of degree of market, we found that the degree can play a certain extent for family-controlled business problem of the poor quality of information disclosure.