Empirical Analysis On Shareholding Structure’s Influence On The Agent Cost And Value Of Chinese Listed Banks

With the fast development of global financial market and the innovation of financial products, the risks of financial institutions are increasing. Since the2008global financial crisis, the market began to think about the origin of the crisis, and realized that in addition to necessary external supervision, the governance structure of financial institutions remained to be improved. The governance structure of financial institutions will not only influence stability and safety of the institutions, but also cause impact to the whole industry. Bank is the main intermediary in financial market, and is one of the most important industries. Bank is important to economy development and stability. If there are problems in bank’s operation, the chain effect will happen and make the economy worse. Though the capital market of our country develops fast, but because of its late starting and imperfection, the development of economy heavily depends on the bank. So, it is very important to keep bank system in a healthy state for our country.This paper includes six parts. The first part is preface, introducing research background, research purpose, research method, research framework and inadequacies of this paper. The second part is articles review, mainly summarizing the research method and achievements on the related issues of scholars home and abroad. The third part is theoretical research, including the theoretical foundation and theoretical analysis on the shareholding structure’s influence on the agent cost and value of Chinese listed banks. The fourth part is the analysis on present conditions of the shareholding structure, agent cost and value of Chinese listed banks. The fifth part is empirical analysis. On the basis of related theoretical analysis, this paper adopts sample data from listed banks and set index to measure shareholding structure, agent cost and value of Chinese listed banks, and then compares the conclusions to the research hypothesis. The sixth part is research results and policy suggestion. At last, it draws the conclusions:The results show the conclusions:a proper proportion of national shareholder can reduce agent cost and improve the value of bank, but the proportion should not be too high. The proportion of corporate share is positively related with the value of bank and negatively related with agent cost. The equity restriction ration can reduce agent cost and improve value of the bank. The proportion of the first shareholder and the sum of top ten shareholders’proportions is negatively related with profitability of bank. The high concentration of shareholding structure may influence the profitability and reduce the value of bank. The proportion of equity circulation is negatively related with the value of bank. On the basis of the conclusions, this paper will put forward some advice for improving corporate governance.Though the conclusions of this paper conform to theory, and make a little progress, but there are still some problems in this paper and need to be improved.1. Because some banks just went to public in2010, so the data is limited. We cannot make a long term study on these banks, and it may influence the final results.2. This paper makes multiple linear regression model as analytical model, and this may decrease the accuracy on variable correlation. The correlation between some variates may be quadratic function or cubic function, even more complicated relationship. This problem needs to be studied further.3. This paper only considered the shareholding structure’s influence on the value of banks, and it did not take other factors into consideration, such as bank operation model, external environment. These problems may cause influences on the value of banks.