The Nature Of Property Right, Cash Flow Sensitivities Of Investment And Investment Efficiency

Numerous studies about international finance, which in recent years have beenconducted both at home and abroad, indicate that there is a significant correlationbetween corporate investments and internal cash flow. Shortage or overabundance incash flow will result in corporate under-or overinvestment and subsequently harm theinterests of shareholders and any other stakeholder in the company severely. The mainstudies strongly advocate a number of enterprise investment theories such as the “FreeCash Flow Hypothesis” or the “Financial Constraint Hypothesis”, and in accordancewith these plead for relevant governance measures.Based on the property right system, and by concern the relationship between thecapital investment and cash flow, this paper further studies on the subject whether theinvest decision is influenced by agency or information problem. At the same time,through DEA means for the determination of investment efficiency, this articlestudied the relationships of investment efficiency and property rights of enterprises,internal cash flow, and the efficiency investment behavior in depth.The paper applies positive research method, combined with normative researchmethod. Then this thesis construct simulation models based on literatures commentand background analysis, from the theoretical analysis results extend the meaning outof the empirical meaning, use of Chinese listed company financial data. Combinedwith the present situation of our country’s system background. Property righteconomics and investment theory reference for the related research achievements. Toour country different property and enterprise investment-cash flow sensitivity and itsinvestment efficiency are analyzed and inspection, the last conclusion.Through the study found in this paper:(1) In our country, whether state-ownedproperty control enterprise or private property control enterprise, there are investment-cash flow sensitivity. But both investment cash flow sensitivity agent is different, thestate-owned property right of control enterprise investment cash flow sensitivity fromthe agency problem, and private property control enterprise investment cash flowsensitivity is caused by financing constraints.(2)In the listed companies of Chinauniversal existence "reverse Tobin Q" phenomenon, namely Tobin Q the higher thevalue, the smaller the investment spending, and Tobin Q on behalf of the listedcompany of investment opportunity theory is not consistent.(3)The listed companiesin China generally very low investment efficiency, and different property and enterprise with different investment efficiency. The private property rights controlenterprise investment efficiency is the highest, the central government controlstate-owned enterprise investment efficiency is the second smallest, and the localgovernment control state-owned enterprise investment efficiency theworst.(4)Excessive investment and investment shortage of these two kinds of nonefficiency investment behavior to the enterprise investment efficiency of the influenceis significant differences, and excessive investment behavior bring investmentefficiency lower.(5)Management holding the corporate governance mode and no playtheir due incentive effect.