Research On The Effection Of Major Shareholder On Executive Equity Incentive Performance

The stock option incentive plan drives from the West. It makes the managers ofthe corporation have the right to share the profits and risks through giving them acertain equity, which can improve corporate governance and equity structure, easeprincipal-agent problem and then increase enterprise value. The implementation of thestock option incentive plan in our country is later then the West and the researchconclusions of different scholars have great differences. In our country, the ownershipof the corporation is much more concentrated and the capital markets are not perfecttoday, which is different from that of the West, so we can’t copy the foreign shareincentives. In order to give full play to the incentive effect, we should design it on thebasis of our own situation. So, research on the effection of major shareholder onexecutive equity incentive performance has important practical significance.In order to analyze the effection of major shareholder on executive equityincentive performance, this paper establishes a regression model based on the equityincentive related theory and corporate control theory. Then I carry on the researchthrough descriptive statistics and multivariate regression analysis. The results showedthat there has no significant linear relationship between the stocks held by managersand corporate performance, and the control of the large shareholder significantly affectthe equity incentive performance. What’s more, there has significant conflicts betweenlarge shareholders and the managers. In addition, this paper classify the whole sampleon the base of the nature of the equity. This study find that, the incentive effect of thestate-owned enterprises is not significant and the control of the large shareholder hasno significant effect on the management equity incentive. On the contrary, there hassignificant conflict between the large shareholder and the managers. So, it indicatesthat the large shareholder’s misconduct damage the interests of the small shareholders.