The Empirical Of Influence Of Risk-taking、on Monetary Compensation Contracts

Countries in economic transition, development funds, namely financing problems, is always a difficult problem to the development of social economic organization, the enterprises, especially private enterprises, due to the high threshold of direct financing, financing costs and other factors, such as government regulation strictly, bank credit financing has become the enterprise of all the economic transformation countries the most main way to solve the financing problem. However, due to the soft environment of economic transition countries lack of institutional problems, such as the law is not sound, strong, market monopoly ownership discrimination and frequent government intervention, such as the behavior of commercial Banks tend to deviate from the commercial principle, and the market-oriented economy behavior dislocation, bank credit resource allocation in the field of low efficiency, derived the huge potential of bad assets, thereby increasing the moral hazard of commercial Banks, opportunism and rent-seeking behavior, performance in its sensitivity to the risk is not high, in the process of operation in order to strive for more expected profit and win political promotion "applause" and high risk, the formation of excessive competition and low efficiency of resource allocation, against commercial bank must abide by the management principle of caution, to some extent, this also seriously damage the interests of the broad masses of investors. In transition economies, therefore, against the agency risk of commercial Banks, regulatory failure and other issues, design effective equity agent mechanism become extremely important and urgent problem, so, executive compensation incentive mechanism, provides us with a whole new perspective.Executive pay as an important mechanism of corporate governance, its purpose is to prompt the behavior of the agent and the principal goal is consistent, resulting from information asymmetry, in order to solve the principal-agent problem (Jensen and Mecking,1976). In order to effectively solve the problem of equity agency, improve the efficiency of commercial bank credit resource allocation, executive compensation contract incentive mechanism provides a useful perspective for us. Therefore, based on the current special economic environment of China’s economic transition, this paper takes2001-2012China a-share listed Banks empirical data as the research sample, using the ordinary least squares (OLS) linear regression model, from the perspective of bank risk bearing test whether the bank executive pay has risk sensitivity, and further expounds the as shareholders agent whether the supervision mechanism of the board of directors has affected the risk sensitivity of executive compensation contracts. The research result shows that the listed bank executive compensation contract with bank of China close correlation between risk-taking, embodied in:commercial Banks has significant negative correlation between executive compensation and risk-taking, the risks of banking executive compensation contracts has obvious inhibitory effect, the executive compensation of listed Banks also means that China has stronger risk sensitivity, but the board of directors and independent directors significantly reduced the risk of executive compensation sensitivity, and the board size and risk bearing on executive pay constraints show instead of the relationship between each other. Further research results show that the above results in non-state-owned holding is present in the bank, in state-controlled Banks, executive compensation contract also has the risk sensitivity, but there was no direct evidence that the board of directors governance risk to executive compensation sensitivity have a significant impact; At the same time, relative to the state-controlled Banks, executive compensation risk sensitivity in non-state-owned holding bank appear stronger. Executive compensation has the risk sensitivity of commercial bank provides direct empirical evidence, enriched the bank compensation contracts and risk control aspects of the research literature, the corporate governance of commercial Banks, the incentive mechanism and risk control has strong reference significance.Innovation point of this paper is to study past did not focus on the final corporate governance factors as intermediate variables of monetary compensation and the influence of the relationship between risk, this paper therefore provides an important influence in the middle of the path, namely the state-controlled will weaken and the relationship between risk management incentive, states that the board governance structure is the future research in this field should be considered one of the important factors, so as to expand the research in the field.Listed Banks can be divided into two state-owned and non-state-owned subsample respectively, extend the depth of the study, for the research provides a new research perspective.In addition, foreign literature basically believe that stock option incentive can reduce the manager’s risk aversion, and thus motivate executives. And the study of monetary compensation incentive and risk bearing little, even if there were a few related research its research conclusion also does not support monetary compensation could prompt managers to adventure. And using the data of China found that monetary compensation incentive can make executives are willing to pay a higher risk, and thus the agency conflicts between managers and shareholders. So this is about management incentive and risk bearing study provides empirical evidence, further enrich the study of the influence factors of risk bearing, also widens the research framework of risk exposures.