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Audit Opinion On Executive Pay Performance Sensitivity

Posted on:2015-01-24Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:X Y FengFull Text:PDF
GTID:2269330428985175Subject:Accounting
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
Modern enterprise is based on the principal-agent theory, the owners of the company shareholders delegate as a manager of senior management personnel of owner company in daily operation and management, and our duty is to maximize shareholder interests. Due to the company’s professional managers and not the real owner of company, they just business agent, this would inevitably lead to the two rights separation. The modern currency of salary incentive system for senior management behavior is a very effective incentive system,it can prompt the pursuit goal of the senior managers of infinite close to the entrusted requirements of the principal, allowing a reduction in the maximum possible owners of principal-agent cost, and the shareholders pay for professional managers tend to be what they are most willing to pay the amount of the fee.The formation of good currency salary incentive system, should be considered in a good relationship between the executive pay and corporate operating results, on the basis of contact enterprise specific time situation, apply the system flexible to practice in play a role constraints on the behavior of top management at the same time to complete the purpose of reduce agency costs. And in the process of practical application of the compensation incentive system, the owner of the enterprise shareholders hire auditors, senior management staff reported to the independent audit of financial statements information. Auditor on the basis of access to relevant audit evidence, by using professional knowledge and professional judgment, the business unit is the legitimacy of the financial statement information fairness, the form has the reference value of the authentication opinions, the audit opinion. External independent audit and the managers’ salary incentive system whether there is a connection, the correlation on executive compensation and corporate performance, on the basis of empirical research, obtained by further testing. Although further research has been mainly analyze relationship between audit opinion type and compensation, not pay sensitivity, and the Angle of the salary incentive system. In this paper, based on the present situation to carry out research in this paper.Article first reviews the related literature research of audit opinion and the company pay performance sensitivity, from two aspects of foreign domestic are summarized, and the results of this study are briefly reviewed. Next summarized this article involves the main concepts and the theoretical basis of empirical research:audit opinion concepts and related theories, pay performance sensitivity concepts and related theories. On this basis, from the selection of the tai an database of listed companies in China from2008to2012, the annual data as the empirical analysis of this paper sample, certified public accountants of the influence of the authentication opinions on executive pay performance sensitivity to build model and regression analysis. Finally, on the basis of the regression results are the empirical analysis, is the current managers’ compensation incentive system in our country, put forward the policy consensus, rich executive compensation structure, formulation and incentive system should be considered when the external audit, such as research and advice.
Keywords/Search Tags:agency theory, Salary incentive system, Audit opinion, Executivecompensation performance sensitivity
PDF Full Text Request
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