Research On The Governance Effect Of Cash Dividend Distribution Based On Agency Cost Theory

Dividend agency theory as one of the mainstream theory of dividend distribution policy currently, in foreign countries have got the empirical test, the cash dividend distribution is considered to be an effective internal governance mechanism, but the domestic scholars on the research of the dividend agency theory has yet to form a consensus. Based on securities and futures commission in2008issued by the mandatory dividend policy as the background, first of all listed companies in China from1992to2011of dividend distribution policy description statistics, analysis found that dividend distribution of listed companies in our country presents the following three characteristics:there are different forms of dividend distribution but gradually is given priority to with cash dividend distribution, stable cash dividend per share and cash dividend distribution characteristics is maturing. Then, combined with Chinese special economic system and the system background, deeply analyzes the listed companies in our country the causes of two kinds of agent cost and form of expression. In the previous theoretical analysis and qualitative analysis, this article takes our country allocation of cash dividends,2008-2011A-share listed companies as the sample data, using multiple linear regression method of cash dividend distribution and the relationship between the two kind of agency cost has carried on the empirical research. The empirical results show that:(1) the cash dividend distribution rate significantly negative correlation with the management expense ratio, can effectively inhibit on-the-job consumption, reduce agency cost between shareholders and managers;(2) because our country listed company of the agency cost between shareholders and managers in state-owned shares is mainly due to the absence of "owners", in this paper, the state-owned enterprises and non-state-owned holding companies has carried on the comparative study, found that the governance effect of cash dividend distribution is more prominent in the state-owned enterprises, in the study also found that the management equity mechanism of shareholding state holding listed companies in China not reduce agency cost, it will become a recessive welfare system;(3) the cash dividend distribution and other receivables to total assets ratio is significantly negative correlation, can effectively reduce the number of the controlling shareholder capital takes up level, so the cash dividend distribution can reduce agency costs between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders, and also found that due to the excessive concentration of equity of listed companies in our country, the other shareholders of the controlling shareholder of checks and balances mechanism can’t play their role in governance. Therefore, this paper argues that dividend agency theory suitable for Chinese capital market, cash dividend distribution can reduce two types of agency costs playing a governance effect.