To Reconstruct The Incentive Mechanism Of Environmental Public Interest Litigation-

Differs from traditional environmental public interest litigation and private interest litigation exists in the party structure. In the tradition of private interest litigation, the parties set "dispute the victim," "fight for their own interests spokesmen" and "litigation beneficiaries" triple identity in one. In environmental public interest litigation, the party structure has undergone significant changes, only as "the spokesman for the environmental public interest", "obligation guardian of environmental resources," bear the responsibility to start litigation. Changes in environmental public interest litigants structure, resulting in the traditional private interest litigation among the incentives can not play its due role in environmental public interest litigation, the plaintiff environmental public interest litigation in the absence of effective incentive mechanism, making the find violations, lawsuits aspects of the program as well as monitoring the behavior of such proceedings are not active agents, which led to environmental public interest litigation targets can not be reached. Countermeasures that focus on the party structure changes after environmental public interest litigation plaintiff’s agent as a key incentive to change the name of the plaintiff are not enthusiastic about the status, to promote the healthy development of environmental public interest litigation.Part I: Overview of environmental public interest litigation. What is the public interest litigation? What is the environmental public interest litigation? Introduced its definition and characteristics, the concept of public interest litigation in the host, and clearly define what is environmental public interest litigation, to pave the way later in the discussion.Part II: the difference between the traditional private interest litigation and environmental public interest litigants structure. For structural distinction between the parties, mainly to be explained from its surface structure, deep structure of the difference between the two.Part III: the plight of the parties under the incentive structure changes the perspective of environmental public interest litigation. In environmental public interest litigation, the parties due to structural changes, leading to internal private interest litigation among traditional incentives can not play its due role, the plaintiff environmental public interest litigation in the absence of effective incentives, violations found in the proceedings aspects such as legal representatives as well as monitoring the behavior of enthusiasm is not high, which led to an embarrassing predicament environmental public interest litigation, can not achieve the intended purpose of the establishment of environmental courts. Changes in the structure of the party, what incentive mechanism causing environmental public interest litigation which predicament? And lead to the plight of reason? In the demonstration clearly produce difficulties arising after the cause difficulties for the solution guidance.Part IV: environmental public interest litigation incentives extraterritorial inspection. This part of the advantages and disadvantages of the United States, "the losing party pay" rule and the "bounty hunter" system in the public interest litigation incentives in play, and to introduce our environmental public interest litigation established judicial practice "environmental charity fund" model, discussion at the rationality and deficiencies of its existence. Overall in the introduction of foreign incentive system, based on the analysis of the advantages of the various systems, and pointed out its shortcomings.Part V: Improvement of environmental public interest litigation incentives proposal. Through our existing judicial practice "environmental charity fund", "loser burden" rule, more "bounty hunter" system, select a suitable for China’s national conditions and meets the requirements of a public interest litigation inherent compatibility effective incentives, ultimately play a real incentive, in order to promote the healthy development of environmental public interest litigation.