| As a special kind of enterprise, commercial banks in the status of a country’s financial and even the entire economic system is very important. From the financial system, commercial bank is the primary mediator of the monetary policy. From the point of the whole economic system, commercial bank is one of the operation hubs of modem social economic. The commercial bank can management steadily or not, related to the good run of the whole social economic. The subprime crisis broken out in2008in the US, brought serious influence on the global economy, the main reason is the huge credit risk resulted in by the lending agency lend to subprime borrowers. The exits of the commercial bank on account of risk-taking, however, the frequently bank crisis make people realize the importance of credit risk control. Perfect corporate governance structure is the premise and foundation of bank risk prevention, so the commercial bank must set up scientific^effective internal governance structure, to fundamentally enhance the banks’ capability of credit risk prevention.In recent years, commercial banks in our country are listed one after another, the total amount of deposit and loan increased steadily, by the end of2012, banking financial institutions’deposit balance is￥94.3trillion, loan balance is￥67.3trillion. Capital strength increased obviously, asset quality is stable, non-performing loan ratio falling constantly, and these arc the positive effects of shareholding system reform. However, there still many problems and deficiencies in commercial banks’corporate governance, in order to fundamentally reduce the credit risk of the bank, we must starting from the governance of the banks themselves, improve the internal governance structure of commercial banks.This paper based on the current development situation of our country’s commercial banks, and on the basis of reading a large number of relevant literatures, analyzes the impact of commercial banks" internal governance structure to credit risk, then select14listed banks’annual data of2007-2012, empirically analysis these data through the panel data model. The main content of this paper can be divided into several aspects:The first part is introduction, mainly introduced the background、purpose、 significance、method、ideas and framework, as well as the possible innovation and deficiency of this paper.The second part is the related theories and literature reviews, this part firstly introduces the basic theory of corporate governance, and then elaborate the theory of corporate governance structure and credit risk, finally induction and summary the literature of bank corporate governance’s impact on credit risk.The third part is the theoretical analysis of bank corporate governance’s impact on credit risk, this section divide the commercial banks’ internal governance structure into ownership structure、board structure、the board supervisors structure and the incentive-restricted mechanism, on the basis of summarizing the predecessors’analysis’results, respecting expounds the impact of these four parts on credit risk.The fourth part is the empirical analysis of bank corporate governance’s impact on credit risk, this part select14listed banks’ annual data of2007-2012, select the non-performing loan ratio as the explained variable to measure credit risk, select ownership concentration、ownership structure、board size、 independent directors proportion、the number of board meeting、the scale of the board supervisors、the number of the supervisor meeting、executive compensation and holding or not as explanatory variables to measure the internal governance structure of the bank. In addition, put the assets as control variables to study. Finally, this paper based on the previous theoretical and the empirical analysis results, put forward some suggestions of improve the internal governance structure and prevent credit risks.The fifth part is the conclusions, this part firstly summarize the empirical results of chapter four, obtain the following conclusions: for the ownership structure, the sum holding of the top three shareholders is significantly negative correlation with the bank credit risk, the proportion of state-owned shares is significantly positive related to credit risk; in terms of the board structure, the number of the board is significantly negative correlation with credit risk, the relationship between the proportion of independent directors and the credit risk is not obvious, there’s no relationship between the credit risk and the number of board meeting; to the structure of board supervisors, the number of the board supervisors is significantly negative correlation with the credit risk, there’s no relationship between the credit risk and the number of supervisor meeting; in the aspect of incentive-restricted mechanism, the relationship between the executive compensation and the credit risk is inconspicuous, management shareholding is significantly positive correlation with the credit risk. |
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