This thesis studies the determinants of bank loan loss provisioning behavior and whether the current provisioning system amplify credit fluctuations of China’s commercial banks over the period of2004-2011. I distinguish between public and private banks, city banks and national banks, and exploit the impact of the New Accounting Policy on banks’ earnings management. The result shows that forward-looking provision is used by China’s banks. I find strong support for the hypothesis that loan loss provisions are used for income smoothing. Both city banks and non-listed banks have a stronger incentive to smooth their income through loan loss provisions. Meanwhile, compared with non-listed city banks with bond issues, non-listed city banks without bond issuance demonstrate more significant income-smoothing behavior. In addition, the implementation of New Accounting Policy has no significant impact on banks’ income-smoothing behavior. I do not find the evidence of capital management and signaling. As to the signal of current provisioning system, I find that non-discretionary loan loss provisions result in greater credit volatility while discretionary loan loss provisions have no significant impact on credit volatility. |