Economic Analysis Of The Imputation Principlesof Tort Liability Act

Law and Economics is built in1960s, the representative figures are Coase,R.Hand Guido Calabresi. By the1970s, Economic Analysis Law Science is Formalized,the landmark events are the publication of 《Economic Analysis Law》, which isPosner’s classic monographs and textbooks, and some journals of Law andEconomics are established. By the1980s, Law and Economics is comprehensivelydeveloped, and truly become an international jurisprudence thought for the publicrecognition and acceptance.From the translation of Posner’s 《Economic Analysis Law》 into China, Lawand Economics has been in China for20years, in this two decades, Law andEconomics firstly as an interesting new vocabulary, become a familiar concept, andscholars have published a large number of works. But the use of Economics analysis,especially the use of Game Theory Analysis, of the specific rules of Law is justbeginning.Except introduction and conclusion, this article include four parts:PartⅠ: This part mainly introduce the economic analysis of law, including thename、definition、the methad and some comcepts which are used in the following parts,and also introduce the philosophical foundation of the Law and Economics, focusingon the method of the Law and Economics. Overall, this part is leading into theeconomic analysis of law.PartⅡ: Our country’s Tort Liability Act establish binary imputation system, theyare fault liability and strict liability. In the process of the analysis of them, we mustthink a model. This model includs two sorts people, they are the aggressor and thevictim. They are participating some activities, and they pay some attention to theactivities. And they not only decide to pay how much attention, but also decide toparticipate how many activities. Supposing accident prevention costs rise andexpected loss decline as the attention level rising, but they rise as the activities rising.Part Ⅲ: In the unilateral accident, from the process of social objective functionand Hand Formula, it can be seen that no-fault liability being compared to faultliability, the total social costs will be internalized, and reduce behavioral level so thatit is equal to the socially optimal level, and strict liability is also better than fault liability in application. Then we come to this conclusion that the strict liability,regardless of the the application and the final results, is better than fault liability.Part IV: In the bilateral accident, from the process of social objective function, itcan be seen that although several forms of fault liability and the modified form ofno-fault liability can lead to a socially optimal level of attention, but because anykinds of rules do not make the behavior of participants internalize the external costs,thus which rules can not result in a socially optimal level of behavior.