Effects Of Regime And Institution Of International Settlement Agencies On Indirect Expropriation

The ongoing discussion of applicable international laws and rulespertaining to regulatory takings (indirect expropriation) has never stopped,mainly focusing on multinational corporations, host countries, NGOs andother participants who claim compensation against regulatory takings. Towhat extent is the governing authority of host countries not held liable foreconomic losses foreign investors suffer from incurred by regulatory takings?Whether regulatory takings constitute indirect expropriation? These are notnew questions in international law study, and applicable claimants, disputejurisdiction, applicable procedures are distinctively different which are oftenpresented in NAFTA and BIT. Whether different institutions and regimes indifferent jurisdictions promote dispute resolution of regulatory takings basedon their specific interests and objectives will be mainly discussed in this article. Different institutions and regimes are not isolated to apply theirindividual rules, to the contrary, some uniform system is formulated withinthem and common goals are established such as investment protection,human rights, regional integration and insurance mechanism, and pushedforward through different mechanism within individual institutions, thereforeinfluence policy making. In fact, it is unlikely to form a unified law rulecovering all regulatory taking issues, each regime has its unique regulationand decision making mechanism to adapt to its specific interests and goals.Regulatory takings cause not only investment disputes which are usuallyanalyzed under international law, but also raise up law split-up issue amongdifferent institutions and regimes due to overlapped capability and interests.Although there are a variety of regimes and institutions with specific goalsdesigned originally, institution control system and selection system ofarbitration members within regimes make sure that verdicts of indirectexpropriation cases are logically consistent, barely with exceptions. China ascapital importing country, now mostly as capital exporting country, hassigned BIT with130countries. How to protect its own investors fromindirect expropriation and improve efficiency of indirect expropriation clauseprovided in BITs it enters into by considering different institutions andregimes? That is a question to ask.