The Research On Bank’s Participation In State-owned Listed Companies’ Interior Supervision

Due to historical reasons, there is a Strong links between China’s banks andstate-owned enterprises. Bank who is the biggest financial supporter to the corporate,occupies the important position in the enterprise financing structure. But what doesnot match with it is, the bank’s rights benefit receives the harm frequently. The banksare not able to know the company’s fund service condition, a company’s dynamicoperating condition on their own initiative. In the more often, they could onlypassively accept the information provided by the company. There are still manyproblems in our company’s information disclosure. Demand for credit protection onthe bank called the bank to pierce the windows of paper between the banks andcompanies, participating the companies’ internal governance institutions and gettingto know the company’s operating and financial information. From the perspective ofstate-owned listed companies, even after the restructuring, there are still manyproblems in the companies’ internal governance mechanisms. Mainly reflected in theinsider control problem is serious, without corresponding checks and balancesstrength. As the main body who has the driving force and supervision capacity, bank’sparticipation in State-owned Listed Companies’ supervision have a great benefit to theimprovement of corporate governance.Article is divided into five parts to analyze the bank’s participation in companyinterior supervisory system.The first part of article starts from the necessity of the system. Considering theinterests of the bank itself, the state-owned listed companies and other creditors,expounds the necessity and urgency on the establishment of the bank’s participation incompany interior supervisory system.The second part of article expounds theoretical basis of the bank’s participation incompany interior supervisory system in detail. Through the analysis of stakeholdertheory and modern contract theory, the author points out their active significances inthe respect of boosting a company governing, at the same time, there may be someproblem on the theory. So we should dialectical treating. The third part of article mainly expounds the practice of the bank’s participation incompany interior supervision at home and abroad. Through comparison system’s samespot and diversity, we get to know the advantages and disadvantages among thedifferent systems. At the same time, it pointed out place which should pay attention inthe future system design.The fourth part of article expounds the design of the bank’s participation incompany interior supervisory system; this is also the focus of the article. In this part,the author elaborates the way of the bank’s participation in companies’ interiorsupervision, the content of the bank’s supervisory right and the limitation of the rights.Establishing the bank’s participation in company interior supervisory systemsystematically.The fifth part of article expounds the bank’s participation in company interiorsupervisory system which is echoes in the law of corporation. Mainly from theintroduction of bank external supervisors, the establishment of new way to exercise ofrights, the enhancement of the bank supervisors’ monitor rights to realize the bank’seffective supervision to the company.