Legal Thinking Of The Milk Powder Monopoly Case

In August,2013, the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) made thepenalty decision to Synbiotics, Mead Johnson, Dumex, Abbott, Wyeth, Bein, Fu Shi Lan(good children), Fonterra, Meiji nine milk companies, six Of which were sentenced to a fineof RMB668billion, triggering major media coverage, supporters say that NDRC purify themilk market environment, while some opponents questioned the decision of punishment withthe insufficient thousand word made by NDRC, they say that the phenomenon, fixed resaleprice or minimum resale price restrictions, is very common in all walks of life, it requiresspecific conditions, should not be generalized that whether which constitutes the verticalmonopoly agreement of article fourteenth of the "anti-monopoly law"The paper analyzes the controversial issues of this event from legal perspective anddraws the relevant inspiration, the paper is divided into three parts:The first part: Milk monopoly case presentation. This section includes details of the case,summarization and brief discussion legal issues behind the case.The second part: Analysis on the legal issues of the milk monopoly case. This is the mostimportant part of this article, which mainly demonstrates that whether the conduct that milkpowder manufacturers require downstream distributors fixed resale prices or minimum resaleprice restrictions constitutes the vertical monopoly regulated by the antitrust law. Itspecifically includes the following two points: first, whether resale price maintenance regardthe elimination or restriction of competition effect as a constituent element, that is to say, theanalysis of such behavior use the reasonable analysis principle or itself illegal principle. Theauthor approves of the reasonable analysis principle and demonstrates its rationality; Second,whether the resale price maintenance have impact on eliminating or restricting competition.The author mainly demonstrates from four aspects. Firstly, nine milk companies formedimplied conspiracy to restrict competition between brands; Secondly, it deprives downstreamoperators’ right to carry out price competition, and restrict intra-brand competition; Moreover,through the comparative analysis of the price, quality, service three aspects, which damagesthe interests of consumers; Finally, which does not have the obvious effect on promotingcompetition. According to the results of the analysis, the author makes a conclusion whetherNDRC’s penalty decision meets the law or not. The third part: The enlightenment. Through the analysis of the case, the author finds theinadequate legislation of resale price maintenance, then puts forward my own opinions onlegislative gaps of analysis principles and tacit collusion.