The Normalization Of Criminal Law For Legal Text Of Omission

As opposite to the act in terms of how perpetrator behaves, current criminal law has no specific provisions about how to deal with omission when it comes to conformity of Tatbestand and the idiosyncrasy of responsibility. Therefore, when judges encounter the case of omission in judicial practice, they usually apply the act’s Tatbestand to omission in order to legally penalize the perpetrator who fails to act in certain way. But our question is that Is there any reasons to justify this ways of dealing with problems of omission? In this article, writer thinks that applying act’s Tatbestand to omission is the only way for solving omission cases when omission provisions are not included in current criminal law, but it’s a compelling choice without alternative ones. In the same time, allowing us to handle omission cases that way is based on one prerequisite of legal fiction. Therefore, In the long run the reasonable approach to cope with omission problems doesn’t depend on how judges do but rather relies on how legislators enact omission provisions into criminal law. This article draws focus on the normalized difference between act and omission and goal is to justify the theoretical basis of normalizing omission.Firstly, this article again examines the concept of omission, especially the division of pure omission and non-pure omission. In this article, writer considers that kind of dichotomy is just a empty entity out of many scholars’ wishful thinking and it cannot functions so well as a concept should do due to the fact that the concept of pure omission and non-pure omission has lost its due connotation and extension in practice.Secondly, this article extends discussions on the indifference value proposition of act and omission. This article considers that whether this proposition is true or false directly decides if we can justify the theoretical foundations of normalization of omission. More specifically, it is not necessary for us to normalize omission if that proposition is true because the Tatbestand for omission is available through applying Tatbestand for act to omission. That means only when the proposition is false it is necessary to normalize omission. So this article suggests that indifference value proposition about act and omission is the prerequisite for normalizing omission.Thirdly, in the following part writer specifically draws focus on the analysis of omissions that consist of different mens rea combination, especially drawing attentions on how judges can accurately differentiate omission from act and negligent crime as well as aggregated consequential offense in order to correctly deal with the challenge of how to fairly treat every offenders and make each legal provisions of criminal law collaborate with others. In the end, my goal is to set a train of thought on normative analysis for omission and further to give an effective and efficient approach to normalizing omission.Lastly, after arguing the indifference value proposition is true only when legal fiction is applicable, the main topic exists in how we can normatively fix the perpetrator’s responsibility for omission, because we must eliminate the side-effect caused by legal fiction. Only by doing this can every perpetrator be treated fairly. Moreover, writer exemplifies three kinds of idiosyncrasy of responsibility for omission and thus can complete the process of normalizing omission.