The Rules And Regulation Of Monopolies In The Patent Standardization Process

Qualcomm have suffered an anti-monopoly investigation and administrative punishment all over the world, because of the abuse of standards essential patents license dominant market position. After Huawei v. IDC in2013,the legitimacy of the patent standardization under review one more time. Due to the particularity of standards with patents, using standard essential patents resulting in monopolistic behavior problems frequently. By analyzing a series of typical cases,summed up in the patent standardization process, setting technical standards,licensing the standards essential patent, and applying for injunctive relief,monopolistic behavior are existing. In order to solve all kinds of monopoly behavior in patent standardization process, this paper made specific recommendations.This paper is divided into five parts in the structure.The first part, Introduction. This part with "Qualcomm punishment case" as the starting point, points out patent standardization easily leads to monopolization. In the three stages of the patent standardization process, there are different monopolistic behavior and will be analyzed、solved below.The second part, analyzing the monopoly behavior in the process of setting technical standards. In this section, by analyzing the "Qualcomm punishment case",Qualcomm v. Broadcom patent infringement cases, summed up the monopoly behavior in standard-setting stage: one is the lack of "essential" patents recognized authorities, standards and procedures; the other is the essential patentee violates patent information disclosure obligations, exploitation of the patent.The third part, analyzing the monopoly behavior in the process of licensing the standards essential patent. In this section, by analyzing the Huawei v.IDC case(standard patent licensing fees), the Microsoft v. MOTOROLA case, Huawei v.IDC case(abusing the dominant market position), summed up the monopoly behavior in standards essential patent-licensing stage: First, the essential patentee violates FRAND commitments, refused to license the essential patent; Second, the essential patentee violates FRAND commitments, asked unfair、unreasonable licensing fees;Third,the essential patentee adds other restrictive trading conditions.The fourth part, analyzing the monopoly behavior in the process of applying for injunctive relief. In this section, according to the MOTOROLA v. Apple, Samsung v. Apple cases, summed up the essential patentee may be rely on the inevitable patent to be monopolistic, and the existing laws lack the necessary reasonable restrictionon the patentee to apply for injunctive relief section.The fifth part, the paper puts forward for the solution of the monopoly behavior in patent standardized three stages. Based on the regulation of the patent law,anti-monopoly law as out regulation. Its core is to establish an applicable rules to formulate the whole process of patent standardization. Specifically: First, improving the patent examination authority and standards of the standard-setting process;Second, adding the FRAND principles into law,in order to directing the licensing standards essential patent and determining the considerations of essential patents FRAND royalty rates; Third, establishing a statutory requirement to issue injunctive relief system.