With the rapid development of Electronic Commerce, a large number of large B2C companies suchas Amazon, Jingdong Mall and Suningyi are rising and occupying the market of traditional channelretailers. in consideration of different sources of enterprises’ channels,their own economic strengthand marketing strategies and so on, the price and the value-added service level of same products willhave certain differences. The traditional retailers and online retailers in the dominant position of themarket need to consider how to make effective price and service strategies to ensure theircompetitiveness in the market, while many small retailers in the weak position of the market, such asmany medium-sized sellers on Taobao and many small stores also need to consider how to survive inthe tough market environment and even stand out from the crowd.Under the condition that retailers provide the value-added service for customers, the paper mainlyconsiders the effect of retailers’ value-added service cost information and the espillover effect ofservice to the competition strategies of dual channel supply chain members.studies the value of theprivate value-added service cost information for manufacturers and how the espillover effect ofservice affects the profit of weak retailers when manufacturers make a cooperation with dominateretailers. Specific content is as follows.This topic first, under the shared and private information conditions, establishes the model of dualchannel supply chain based on value-added cost information with respect to retailers’ incrementalcosts. Then by using Stackelberg master-slave game under different conditions, analyses the optimalpricing, supply chain coordination strategies and the value of incremental costs information formanufacturers and retailers under the shared condition. The result shows that manufacturers willbenefit from the retailers’ cost information, when the cost of the retailers’ value-added service is lowerthan a threshold, retailers will take the initiative to share their information with manufacturers.Secondly, under the market environment of dominant retailers and weak retailers, the topic builds asupply chain game model with one manufacturer and two retailers, studies supply chain coordinationproblems under the two conditions of independent decision-making and strong manufacturers andretailers centralized decision-making, analyses the optimal pricing and service strategies underdifferent conditions, shows the conditions in which weak retailer can benefit and manufacturers willcooperate with strong retailers through the numerical simulation. The study finds that manufacturerswould choose to cooperate with strong retailers in the low level of price competition, retailers couldachieve the "win-win" condition by providing differentiated levels of prices and services, the interaction between the influence of service differences between channels on the demand and thedegree of the spillover effects of serves is the key for weak retailers to benefit from the cooperation ofmanufacturers and dominant retailers. |