A Research Of The Relationship Between Heterogeneity Of Institutional Investors And Corporate Investment Efficiency

Investing activities are the core of corporate financial management and the direct cause ofvalue creation. Efficient investment policy enables enterprises to achie ve higher profits, createmore value. However, due to principal-agent problem and information asymmetry problems,over-investment or under-investment of inefficient investment phenomenon is prevalent inChina’s listed companies. How to inhibit the inefficient investment effectively has become along-term concern and important issue in academics and practitioners. In the West maturecapital markets, institutional investors are the most important participants in stock market, andbegan to change in positive shareholders. Role in improving the corporate governancestructure, inhibit non-efficiency investments has become increasingly prominent. With thedevelopment of our country’s economy, institutional investors have gradually become animportant force in China’s securities market, its impact on the stock market is also growing, itis also experiencing the transitional period as the negative doctrine change to the positivedoctrine. But there are many important differences between institutional investors, Itscharacter and nature impact on the ability and willingness of its participation in thegovernance of listed companies, which may lead to have a different influence on the decisionsof the investment. Researching if institutional investors are actively involved in the corporategovernance during the transition period and the relationship between heterogeneity ofinstitutional investors and investment efficiency is theoretical and practical significance.This paper analyzes the impact of institutional investors on corporate investmentefficiency both in mechanism and empirical research. In empirical terms, use the data of2011-2012A-share manufacturing enterprises for the study. Classifying institutional investors fromtwo dimensions to do empirical test respectively, the results show that: The stake ofinstitutional investors as shareholders are positively correlated to the corporate investmentefficiency; The stake of pressure-resist and pressure-sensitive institutional investors asshareholders are positively correlated to the corporate investment efficiency; Potentialpositive institutional investors did not fulfill the role of an active shareholder, are not theactive institutional investors in the true sense, but take "vote with their feet" investmentstrategy passively, did not participate in the corporate governance actively and play a role in suppressing non-efficiency investments. Summary, the positive correlation between the stakeof institutional investors as shareholders and corporate investment efficiency, is only the resultthat institutional investors choose better quality of listed companies.For the above conclusions, This paper puts forward some suggestions to promoteinstitutional investor change to active shareholders: One is to strengthen infrastructureconstruction of the market, create a favorable environment for institutional investors todevelopment and growth; The second is to promote the coordinated development of all typesof institutional investors, further enhance the role of professional investment institutions instabling the stock market; The third is to strengthen the supervision of institutional investors,and improve the governance of professional organizations.