Empirical Study On Executive Compensation Incentive Effect About Listed Banks In Our Country——Based On EVA

In recent years, when the annual reports are published by the listed companies, people from all walks of life was always shocked by the "sky-high price" from the information of the listed bank executive’s payment. Academia, the media and other people from all walks of life have questions, such as how much payment bank executives should take from bank? If Executive payment is pegged to the bank’s performance? If Executive compensation make a contribution to the bank’s performance? Executive Compensation incentive was come up to resolve the principal-agent problem. Its purpose is to convergent the interests of and shareholders and make the executives work harder for increasing shareholders wealth. Domestic scholars have done lots of research on bank executive payment incentive problems. However, there isn’t any unified research solution formed. Before doing the research, I have reviewed lots of papers. Then I have knowledge of relevant theories. I detailed introduces the bank executive payment and the calculation of EVA index. Finally I select the unbalanced pane data of16listed commercial Banks in2007-2011. By using fixed effect model, I empirically analyze the executive compensation incentive effect on corporate performance. The result is that there are no significant correlation between executive payment and the performance of banks. State-owned bank executive pay and bank performance are significantly negatively related, non-state-owned commercial bank executive payment has positive incentive on bank performance but this incentive is not significant.