Research On The Impact Of Institutional Environment And Media Governance On Controlling Shareholders’ Expropriation Behavior

There are serious “dominance” in China’s listed companies on the institutionalbackground of transition economies. The controlling shareholders implement absolutecontrol to impact the company’s financial behavior against the interests of smallshareholders to varying degrees. Therefore, the study of controlling shareholders’expropriation behavior constraint factors has far-reaching theoretical reference value.This thesis selected three expropriation behaviors to research which occur frequentlyrecently and bring greater damages, namely the controlling shareholders’ illegal relatedtransactions, the controlling shareholder manipulations of financial information disclosure,the controlling shareholder price manipulation during additional oriental issue process.Then it analyzes the reasons why the controlling shareholders expropriation behaviorgenerate theoretically, and explores how the institutional environment, media governancemake effect on the controlling shareholders expropriation behaviors, and its influencedirection.According to the theory analysis, this thesis come up with hypotheses, and makes anempirical test. The thesis selected three indicators as alternative variables of institutionalenvironment factors, namely the overall level of regional market, legal and protection level,the degree of government intervention. This thesis selects the Shanghai and ShenzhenA-share listed companies which have unfair pricing related transactions in2010as samples.Then this thesis makes multiple linear regression analysis of the institutional environmentassociated with the controlling shareholder of illegal related trading practices. And thisthesis has selected2010Shenzhen main market listed companies as samples. According tothe information disclosure ratings published in credit file of Shenzhen stock exchangingwebsite, this thesis scores the quality of information disclosure of listed companies. Thisscore is taken as interpreted variables of the controlling shareholder manipulation ofinformation disclosure behavior. Then this thesis makes logistic regression analysis of the relationship between institutional environmental and the illegal information disclosurebehaviors of controlling shareholder. As for study whether the media can inhibit thecontrolling shareholder’s behavior of manipulating stock prices duringadditional oriental issue, this thesis selects Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listedcompanies which have raised money from private placements in2012as a matter ofsamples. This thesis takes logarithm of the number of companies’ negative reports fromeight national financial newspapers in the previous year as the variables of mediagovernance. This thesis calculates the cumulative abnormal return of listed companies10consecutive trading days before the pricing benchmark date to examine the pricemanipulation behavior of the controlling shareholder.This thesis draw a conclusion that: the higher the overall level of the market area, thehigher the level of legal and investor protection, the less government intervention, thenthere are the less unfair related transactions traded by controlling shareholders of listedcompanies in this area; the higher the total regional market level, the higher the level oflegal and investor protection, the better quality of accounting information disclosure oflisted companies, the less controlling shareholders who manipulate information disclosurein the region; in the private placement process, huge numbers of media attention andcoverage of listed companies will significantly reduce negative cumulative abnormal stockreturns of the company, suppress the controlling shareholder’s price manipulation acts.