Research On The Influence Of Executive Human Capital Incentive On Enterprise Performance Based On Management Power

In the era of the increasingly fierce competition and the rapid development of science and technology, human capital has gradually replaced the material capital and become the most important strategic resource in the modern enterprise. Executives play an important role in the development of the enterprise as the business decision makers. Therefore, how to play effectively the role of the executive human capital and maximize the enterprise value has become the issue that needs earnestly study and solution. Reasonable executive human capital incentive mechanism is an effective way to improve enterprise performance. Management power has become a new hot spot of the domestic and foreign research in the field of executive human capital incentive. Research on management power’s influence on the effect of executive human capital incentive has strong theoretical and practical significance.This paper studies the relationship of executive human capital incentive and enterprise performance from executive monetary compensation, on-the-job consumption and compensation dispersion within the executive team, and explores management power’s influence on the effect of executive human capital incentive. Firstly, according to the principal-agent theory, human capital theory, motivation theory, compensation dispersion theory and management power theory, this paper theoretically analyses the relationship of executive human capital incentive and enterprise performance, and management power’s influence on the effect of executive human capital incentive. Then by using the companies which have listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen A shares during2010-2012, this paper empirically tests the relationship of management power, executive human capital incentive and enterprise performance. The main conclusions drawn are as follows:(1) Executive monetary compensation has a significantly positive impact on the enterprise performance, and compared with the state-owned enterprises, the non-state-owned enterprises’ positive correlation is more obvious. Management power weakens the incentive effect of executive monetary compensation. The larger the management power, the smaller the positive impact on the enterprise performance;(2) On-the-job consumption has a significantly negative impact on the enterprise performance in the state-owned enterprises, but the impact is not significant in the non-state-owned enterprises. Management power increases the negative impact of on-the-job consumption on enterprise performance. The larger the management power, the greater the negative impact on the enterprise performance;(3) Compensation dispersion within the executive team has a significantly positive impact on the enterprise performance, and compared with the state-owned enterprises, the non-state-owned enterprises’positive correlation is more obvious. Management power weakens the incentive effect of compensation dispersion within the executive team. The larger the management power, the smaller the positive impact on the enterprise performance.