Researcon Tearacterstcs Oultimate Controlling In M&A Business On The Influence Of Value Creation

In recent years, mergers and acquisitions in China maintained a rapid momentum ingrowth. Enterprise is not performing well according to most people’s opinion; howevermerger and reorganization can greatly improve its performance. In reality M&A has notimproved a large part of the enterprise’s business performance. Some companies gothrough false behavior of mergers and acquisitions to achieve embezzlement on theinterests of the company. Even some state-owned nature of ultimate controller throughthe enterprise merger and acquisition behavior, high-quality asset transfer out, deeplyaffecting the normal production and business activities of enterprises hence acceleratesthe decline in performance. Under this phenomenon you will find that, behind theoperator is the key to solve the problem. The Chinese CSRC and the Shanghai andShenzhen Stock Exchanges, the two inspections found that behind the operator is usuallynot directly controlling shareholders of listed companies of embezzlement, illegalguarantee and other bad behavior but the ultimate controller of the enterprise. This paperattempts to study the ultimate controller effects to the acquisition of listing Corporationvalue and how this problem is created, ultimately serve as guidance on how to improveChina’s M&A value creation plans to embark on the relevant policy and institutionalreform.Based on the above issues as a research starting point, this paper is divided into fiveparts, the first part: Introduction of the research background and research significance,domestic and international literature review, research methods and contents, andinnovation point. The second part: elaboration of the merger and acquisition enterprisevalue creation and the ultimate control related theory，and analysis of the impact of M&A of ultimate controller’s characteristics to enterprise value creation. The third part:empirical research design. According to the analysis of the previous section, sevenhypotheses are presented. The following are the three most important hypothesespresented as follows: H1: The listing Corporation value creation and negative correlationbetween proportion control (VR). H3: The listing Corporation mergers value creation andcash flow rights/control (SR) positive correlation. H5: The ultimate control by the state owned-nature, human nature of non-state ultimate control right of listed companies intwo deviations from more significant influence on M&A of value creation. The fourthpart: empirical results and analysis. This paper selects occurred1006listing Corporationmergers and acquisitions in2009as the research sample, establish correlation andregression analysis model and the analysis conclusions are as follows:（1）The proportion of vote right (VR) and the listing Corporation merger andacquisition value creation are negative correlation.（2）The cash flow rights/vote rights (SR) andlisting Corporation merger andacquisition value creation are positive correlation.（3）With respect to the ultimate control by the state-owned nature, human nature ofnon-state owned property right of listed companies in two deviations from moresignificant influence on M&A of value creation.Finally in view of the above conclusions, this paper puts forward the relevant policysuggestions which hope can improve M&A of value creation.