An Empirical Research Of Accounting Information And Executive Compensation Based On The Nature Of The Property Rights

After the emergence of modern enterprise system, to achieve the separation of ownership andmanagement. Separation of ownership leads to the generation of principal-agent relationships.However, due to the "rational economic man" as well as information asymmetry, the agent "moralhazard" and "adverse selection" problem appears. Client expectations by signing remuneration-performance contract to constrain the behavior of agents, reduce agency costs. Accountinginformation of enterprises with its inherent superior market information science, accuracy,external oversight and authority as well as a small dependence on external capital markets, etc., sothat enterprises in the developing remuneration contract more reliance on accounting informationrather than market information. New accounting standards implemented in2007, the introductionof fair value measurement model. Gains and losses from changes in fair value as an importantcomponent of net profit, is bound to affect the performance of enterprises in accounting, therebyaffecting the development of executive compensation. Therefore, this article from the perspectiveof the contract, specifically the examination of changes in the angle of executive compensationcontracts and executive compensation correlation between gains and losses in fair value.Our special political and economic systems and special conditions, there are still doomed to alarge number of state-owned enterprises, state-owned enterprises which have special status andhistorical reasons, resulting in its agency relationship there are many shortcomings, theseshortcomings lead to state-owned enterprises operating inefficiencies affect the validity of theremuneration of contract performance. So it is necessary in the study of executive compensationcontract will consider factors including the nature of property rights.Based on the above analysis, this paper from the correlation between the performance oflisted companies accounting and corporate executive pay, relevance and ownership changes in thenature of profit and loss between executive compensation and the fair value of between executivecompensation and accounting information related to the impact of three aspects of the two parts ofthe country and abroad are classified review the existing literature and commentary respectively.Secondly, based on current research and related theoretical analysis, this paper puts forward theresearch hypothesis. Again, the paper of2008-2012in Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listedcompanies as samples, select the total return on assets (ROA) and two indicators of changes infair value (Fair_Value) to reflect the accounting information to the annual report of listedcompanies the natural logarithm of the top three executives total compensation to measureexecutive compensation disclosure, by the nature of the ultimate controller of the sample isdivided into state-controlled listed companies and non-state-controlled listed companies, researchbased on the nature of the property rights of accounting information and high tube relationshipbetween remuneration. Finally, the main conclusions drawn in this paper: there was a significantpositive correlation between executive pay (1) China’s listed companies and accountingperformance of enterprises.(2) The presence of changes in fair value of listed companies, changes in the fair value of executive pay and there is a significant positive correlation betweenincome and changes in fair value and there is no significant correlation between the loss. Thisshows that the introduction of fair value measurement model, the viscosity characteristics ofexecutive compensation persists.(3) Compared with the ultimate control of state-owned listedcompanies, non-state-controlled listed companies executive compensation and accountingperformance sensitivity between its stronger.(4) The presence of changes in fair value gains oflisted companies, compared to the state-owned listed companies, changes in non-state-ownedlisted company executive compensation and the fair value of its sensitivity between stronger andgain ultimate control of.This paper not only studied the correlation between executive pay and accountingperformance between enterprises, to further study the factors affecting the performance ofcorporate accounting-Effect of changes in fair value of executive compensation. On this basis,based on China’s national conditions will consider factors including the nature of property rights,further analysis of the sensitivity of executive compensation and corporate accounting informationbetween the different nature of property rights.Through the above analysis we can see that China’s state-controlled listed companies there isa series of principal-agent problems, while salaries have remained sticky. Therefore, theestablishment of an effective executive compensation incentives need to China’s actual situation,and take for the listed company’s internal and external environment in which appropriate measures,including improvements to the state-owned enterprise managers incentive and restraintmechanisms to reduce state intervention and improve and other aspects related to measurementstandards.