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Research On Corporate Equity Restriction Game Mechanism For Chinese Joint-Venture Railways

Posted on:2015-09-09Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:F XieFull Text:PDF
GTID:2309330431984535Subject:Management Science and Engineering
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
As a new mode of railway development, railway joint-venture brought newvitality to this industry. In recent years, China has accumulated valuable experience inthe construction, operation and management of joint-venture railway. But with thedeepening of reform in the railway investment and financing system, joint-venturerailway companies with diversification investors have appeared, conflicts of interestbetween shareholders of the joint venture railway companies become more and moreprominent.Chinese railway joint venture is hold by the state-owned railway company andvariety of other forms of equity take participation, its shareholders are divided intotwo types-non-state owned shareholders and state-owned shareholders. State-ownedshareholder has the dual attributes (public and corporate nature), which led to theirdifferent objectives with non-state shareholders, this existence of conflict of interestsis bound to affect the healthy development of a joint-venture company. In this article,we take this reason as a starting point, and innovatively analyzing the conflictsbetween shareholders by the angle of incentive compatibility, responsibilities andrights of shareholders. And by exploring the conflict of the interests of theshareholders of the joint venture company and mechanism design theory andmethods,this thesis proved the possibility of theoretical and institutional ways tosolve conflicts of interest and the level of research coordination to strengthencorporate governance from the joint mechanism design for the later laid a railwaycompany foundation.In this thesis, combined with the characteristics of China joint-venture railwaycompanies themselves, using the principal-agent theory, public choice theory buildingshareholder coordination model, provide the model basis for the mechanism design. Through the game of joint venture railway company three shareholders--thestate-owned capital, the local private railway companies and financial investmentmechanism analysis, proposed Joint Venture Railway Company can analyze how toprotect shareholders from two aspects below, especially the interests of minorityshareholders. First is the institutional mechanism, this is from the externalenvironment perspective, such as economic system, political system, legal system onthe protection of the interests of small shareholders. Moreover is the policymechanism, this is the micro structure of the corporate level, charter, rental,investment and financing decisions and dividend policy considerations.On this basis, the thesis puts forward two kinds of coordination of shareholderconflicts of interests between them, one is the optimization of ownership structure,increase the share of non state-owned shareholders to balance each other; the two is inthe corporate governance mode, through the standardization, standardization of thestate-owned shareholders behavior, reduce the damage to the interests of minorityshareholders.
Keywords/Search Tags:Shareholders’ interests conflict, principal-agent theory, gametheory, right equivalence, incentive compatibility
PDF Full Text Request
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