The Game Theory Study On Supervision Of China’s Social Insurance Fund Under Different Links

The past decade is a decade of the rapid development of China’s social insuranceindustry, in which China’s social insurance system had been further improved,management level and operational status of social insurance funds also continued to beimproved, which fund laid a solid foundation for further management of China’s socialinsurance. However, in the situation of the China’s social insurance fund managementand service level continue to improve, there are three more prominent issues: Firstly,there are some illegal phenomena, such as drag to pay, underpaid, not pay socialinsurance fee and so on; secondly, in the actual operation of social insurance agencies,there are some illegal behaviors, such as misappropriation or diversion caused byfinancial and moral risks, and the lack of internal control; Thirdly, due to paymentinformation asymmetry of the social insurance fund, the Social Insurance Fundimpersonator behavior have occurred. So, the social insurance fund management andservice process are damaged by these three illegal behaviors.In this paper, on the theoretical basis of the game theory, the principal-agent theoryand cost-income theory, and in the main use of static game and dynamic game model offull information, it researches the three illegal behaviors which exist in the socialinsurance fund management process and tries to find out the economic and socialvariable factors which impact the social insurance fund management, and further toprovide a theoretical basis for the effective realization of supervision and management ofthe social insurance fund.This article is divided into five chapters as follows: The first chapter introduces therelative concepts and theories. it focuses on the connotation and extension of thedefinition of several important concepts used in the study, and discusses some relatedbasic theory, such as the game theory, the principal-agent theory, cost-income theoryand so on. The second chapter analyzes the regulatory of the collection of China’s socialinsurance funds. it states relevant stakeholders to the collection, and use the gametheory to construct the static game mode, focusing to analyze the strategies and relatedeconomic variables of different stakeholders. The third chapter analyzes the regulatoryof China’s social insurance fund operations. it first clears the relevant stakeholders in the operation, and constructs static and dynamic game model on the basis of the gametheory, focusing to analyze the strategies and related economic variables of differentstakeholders. The fourth chapter analyzes the regulatory of China’s social insurancefund payments. it first clears the relevant stakeholders in the payment and constructsthe static game model, focusing to analyze the strategies and related economic variablesof different stakeholders. The fifth chapter discusses the conclusion and policy advices.Based on the results of the above studies, this paper concludes that the social insurancefund in regulatory practice should adhere to the principle of moderation, costs-incomemaximizing revenue, and gives some suggestions to strengthen and improve thesupervision of China’s social insurance funds in different sectors.