| China’s SME board has made remarkable achievements affects after nearly tenyears of development. It has become a very important part of China’s capital market,and accumulated valuable experience for the construction of the GEM. However,whether the small and medium companies has optimized the ownership structure,used more efficient executive incentives, established and effective corporategovernance system and obtained improved operating performance as expected afterlisted on the SME board is still subject to further research.Based on theories and results of relevant literature, this paper investigates theeffect of the proportion of the first shareholder, sum of square of top three proportionof the shareholders, index of power balance with shareholder structure onpay-performance sensitivity of top management through descriptive statistics andmultivariable linear regression model with the annul data of all SME board companiesin2011. Results show:Corporate performance is significant “U” related with the shareholdingproportion of the first-large shareholder; SME board listed companies can improvecorporate performance by appropriately increase other big shareholders’checks andbalances of the controlling shareholders; there is an significant inverse relationbetween the company’performance and the CEO duality; the coefficient for theindependent director proportion is insignificant; executive compensation incentiveshas positive effect on corporate performance but not obvious; executive equity-basedincentive has positive effect on corporation; corporation performance is moresensitive to executive equity-based incentive than compensation incentive.This paper also gets the following results: under the same condition, thecorrelation-ship does’t change between corporation performance and executiveequity-based incentive; when the shareholding proportion of the first-largeshareholder increases, corporation performance is more sensitive to executivecompensation incentive than before. |
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